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THE OTHER "NEGLECTED" PARTIES IN CHILD
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: PARENTS IN




Lily Marlene Hernandez is a twenty-three year old Dominican na-
tive and a single mother struggling to raise her sons with child support
and public assistance.' One evening in January, 1998, after she put
her children to sleep, Ms. Hernandez carried her trash down her
apartment's cement stairs to the dumpster in a courtyard behind her
building.2 A friend called to Ms. Hernandez from across the court-
yard and Ms. Hernandez stopped by the friend's window to chat for a
moment. Standing in the courtyard, Ms. Hernandez could see into
her kitchen window and, during the half an hour while she was
outside, she glanced into her apartment every few minutes.' What she
did not see, however, turned out to be a painful nightmare for Ms.
Hernandez.
While she was outside of her apartment building, one of her sons
must have woken up. He walked past a window in the front of the
apartment building and caught the eye of a Boston Housing Authority
police officer and his partner.5 Seeing the child, the officers decided
to run upstairs and knock on Ms. Hernandez's door.6 Unable to get
inside the apartment through the door, one of the officers retrieved a
ladder and climbed into Ms. Hernandez's apartment through her front
window.7 The officers did not ask anyone about Ms. Hernandez or
look too extensively for her, for if they had, they would have seen that
she was in the courtyard. Instead, the officers called the Boston police
and took the children from their home.8
Soon after, Ms. Hernandez returned to her apartment to find her
children missing. At this point, she was understandably overwhelmed
by fear and panic: "'I thought I would die. My heart was pounding
out of my chest and I couldn't stop shaking."' 9 The police told Ms.
Hernandez that her children were carted away to the hospital in an
ambulance for a routine checkup and that she would not be allowed to









9. Id (quoting Ms. Hernandez).
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bring them back home. 10 She drove to the hospital in tears and found
her boys; equally terrified, they cried wildly and hugged their
mother." Both boys were determined to be healthy and unharmed.12
Nevertheless, the police had already filed a neglect report with the
Department of Social Services.' 3 Accordingly, Ms. Hernandez was in-
structed to appear in court the next day.' n Luckily, the court ap-
pointed an attorney to represent Ms. Hernandez." Her attorney
explained the situation to the judge and Ms. Hernandez was reunited
with her children that day.16
Ms. Hernandez may have exercised poor judgment when she left
her children unattended for thirty minutes while they slept. Neverthe-
less, this typical story raises questions concerning whether the Depart-
ment of Social Services acts appropriately in these situations: Does
such "poor judgment" justify the state's taking Ms. Hernandez's
healthy and unhurt children in the middle of the night? This question
is particularly important because most cases do not end as swiftly and
painlessly as Ms. Hernandez's case fortunately did.'7 Furthermore,
today, child welfare agencies' actions have even more dire conse-
quences for families charged with neglect than ever before.
On November 19, 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
went into effect across the nation.' 8 This federal legislation signifi-
cantly changed the goals of the child welfare system which, prior to
this law, focused mainly on reuniting families. Rather than working to
help families stay together or reunite after being separated, this new
law directs child welfare agencies to focus primarily on "the child's
health and safety,"' 9 not on the family as a whole. While this may
sound like a laudable goal, this new philosophy may serve to hurt fam-
ilies in poverty who are often the targets of neglect allegations and
who may simply need supportive services from the state to help them





14. Id. At this hearing, the court would determine whether the children would
return to their mother. For a discussion of neglect proceedings, see infra part III.A.
15. Hart, supra note 1, at B3. Massachusetts has codified an indigent parent's
right to court-appointed counsel in neglect proceedings in Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
119, § 29 (West 1994). If she had not been appointed an attorney, Ms. Hernandez
probably would have been unable to adequately present her case to the judge: In
court she was panicked and confused and "her limited English impede[d] her ability
to follow the swift [court] proceedings." Hart, supra note 1, at B3.
16. Hart, supra note 1, at B3.
17. The Boston Globe reports that the Massachusetts Department of Social Serv-
ices removes approximately 8000 children from their homes each year. Id. Most of
these removals are for alleged neglect. Id. Further, unlike Ms. Hernandez and her
sons, the vast majority of families are not reunited right away. Id.
18. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
19. Id. § 101(a)(A).
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children were totally unharmed, were adored and cared for by their
mother, and were terrified when the police took them from their beds,
the Massachusetts Department of Social Services nevertheless rea-
soned that, "'[g]iven that the children were alone, [the Department]
clearly acted in their best interests."'20 Thus, even Ms. Hernandez-
who a judge determined should be reunited with her children immedi-
ately-is subject to potentially devastating state intervention under
this new law.
This Note argues that, in light of the recent change in national child
welfare policy away from a pro-family philosophy, parents in poverty
who are involved in the child welfare system are in greater need than
ever before of competent legal assistance to help them rebuild their
families. Part I of this Note examines two pieces of federal legislation
that affect families in the child protective system: The Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997. This part examines the different philosophies
behind both laws and discusses their shortcomings. Part II introduces
the legal doctrine of neglect as it is applied in the child welfare system.
This part discusses the problems that families in poverty encounter in
the child welfare system and suggests that charges of neglect against
poor parents may actually have more to do with their economic status
than with their fitness as parents. Part III explains the legal proce-
dures in neglect proceedings. This part also reviews the legal repre-
sentation currently afforded to indigent parents throughout the
country and outlines some of the deficiencies in that representation.
Part IV examines why indigent parents are in great need of compe-
tent, effective legal assistance in child protective proceedings. Finally,
part V offers suggestions to states for how to provide indigent parents
with adequate legal representation in neglect proceedings. This part
argues that all states should provide indigent parents with a statutory
right to counsel. In addition, this part proposes that states should es-
tablish and implement a certification program for their court-ap-
pointed attorneys to ensure that this right to counsel is a meaningful
one. This part concludes by offering suggestions to parents' lawyers to
most effectively implement parents' right to counsel, thereby ensuring
that indigent families in the child protective system are best served
throughout the legal process.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION To PRESERVE FAMILIES AND
PROTECT CHILDREN
The state of our nation's foster care system is among the most heav-
ily-debated issues in the area of child protection. The nation's interest
in foster care is not surprising given that foster care spans so many




widely discussed topics, including abused and neglected children,2'
state intervention, 22 race,23 poverty,24 government bureaucracy, 25 and
taxpayers' dollars. 6 Most importantly, the foster care system directly
impacts the nation's poor children. 7 Continued societal interest in
the foster care system is necessary to promote the safety and quality
of life of the most fragile of our nation's population.
Children, however, are not independent or isolated individuals but,
rather, are members of families.28 Therefore, any attempt to help chil-
dren must attempt to help and to heal the entire family. Congress
appropriately recognized children's important familial bonds when it
passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(-1CWA). 2 9
Congress passed the CWA in response to the mounting criticisms of
the foster care system in the late 1970s.30 At that time, the goal of
21. Not only do children sometimes enter foster care to escape abusive biological
parents, but some foster children experience abuse at the hands of their foster par-
ents. See A.B.A., America's Children At Risk 51 (1993) [hereinafter America's Chil-
dren at Risk]. For example, recently in New York City, a foster mother was accused
of "beat[ing] her two-year-old foster daughter until the girl's eyes were swollen shut."
Michael Cooper, Foster Mother Is Charged in Beating of a 2-Year-Old, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 10, 1998, at B5. The girl also had bruises on her back, arms, legs, and shoulders.
Id. The foster mother was arrested on charges of second-degree and third-degree
assault and for endangering the welfare of a child. Id.
22. See Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Chil-
dren From the Home for Poverty Alone, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 447, 452-61 (1997) (criticiz-
ing when states intervene in poor families' lives and harmfully remove children from
their parents).
23. See America's Children at Risk, supra note 21, at 51 ("African-American chil-
dren are overrepresented in foster care. In 1989, about 34% of all children in foster
care were African-American, although only about 15% of all children in the general
population are African-American.").
24. See Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a
State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 519, 527-37 (1996) (arguing
that families in poverty are more likely than other families to be involved in the child
welfare system and criticizing states' treatment of poor families).
25. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender,
Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 600-03
(1997) (discussing "child protection bureaucracies" and how overburdened state
agencies exacerbate the problems that children experience in foster care).
26. See David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications
for Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 183, 195 (1995) (stating
that taxpayers spend between $10,000 and $20,000 for one year of foster care for one
child).
27. See America's Children at Risk, supra note 21, at 51 (stating that poor children
are disproportionately placed into foster care).
28. See Appell, supra note 25, at 611 (asserting that the child welfare system must
come to recognize children as "part and parcel of the family, not as ... unattached
and idealized entitfies]").
29. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500.
30. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termi-
nation of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in livo
States, 29 Fam. L.Q. 121, 122-25 (1995) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Children in Foster
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foster care was to remove children from any and all seemingly unsafe
environments. 3' With this goal, the foster care system eventually grew
to where more than 500,000 children were living apart from their fam-
ilies in 1977.32 Unable to appropriately handle this many children, the
foster care system simply shuffled children around from placement to
placement.33 In 1977, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform,3' the Supreme Court expressed concern over
"foster care drift, ' 35 noting that "many children apparently remain in
this 'limbo' indefinitely."36 Three years later, Congress responded to
this pressing concern by enacting the CWA.37
Congress passed the CWA to provide children with more perma-
nent placements than foster care permitted.3 1 It sought to prevent un-
necessary foster care placements, to encourage permanency planning
for children,39 and to reunify families where possible.40 -[H]eralded
by child advocates across the country,"4 the CWA was based on a
"family preservation philosophy14 2 and, thus, actually promoted the
rights of the entire family:4 3
This philosophy has as its starting point the belief that a child's bio-
logical family is the placement of first preference and that "reason-
able efforts" must be made to preserve this family as long as the
child is safe. Where these efforts fail and the child must be re-
Care] (noting the difficulties that children encountered in the foster care system in the
1970s and discussing federal legislation passed in response to critics of the system).
31. Id. at 122; see also Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases. 63 Geo. L.J. 887,889
(1975) (noting that, because physical distance between parent and child prevents a
child's parent from beating her, the predominant approach to dealing with troubled
families in the 1970s was to separate the child from the parent). This approach, how-
ever, has been criticized for failing to consider damage to the child's emotional health
when she is separated from her family. Id.
32. Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 223, 224 (198911990).
33. Guggenheim, Children in Foster Care, supra note 30, at 122.
34. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
35. See, eg., Guggenheim, Children in Foster Care, supra note 30, at 122 (-The
term 'foster care drift' was coined to describe the plight of children who spent long
periods of time in foster care 'drifting' from placement to placement.").
36. Smith, 431 U.S. at 836.
37. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500.
38. S. Rep. No. 96-336, at 10 (1979). reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1459.
39. Permanency planning refers to the child welfare system's desire to find stable,
long-term, and safe homes for children. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of
permanency planning, see generally Herring, supra note 26.
40. See Shotton, supra note 32, at 223-24.
41. Id at 223.
42. Id. at 255.
43. See Guggenheim, Children in Foster Care. supra note 30. at 111-23 (noting the
difference between the child welfare system of the 1970s, which had relatively no "pro




moved, the family preservation philosophy holds that reasonable ef-
forts must still be made to reunify the child with the family.
44
This pro-family sentiment was a great change from the child rescue
philosophy of the 1970s which "neglected or failed to recognize the
harm that separation can cause to both children and their parents."4
The cornerstone of the CWA is the "reasonable efforts" require-
ment placed on state child welfare agencies. 6 To receive federal
funds for foster care and adoption assistance,47 state child welfare
agencies must "make 'reasonable efforts' to maintain children with
their families or, if this is not possible, . . . make reasonable efforts to
reunify the child with the family.",48 Although Congress created this
requirement as a guide for child welfare agencies to help children and
families, many agencies encountered difficulties in implementing the
requirement.49
Perhaps due in part to the lack of a clear definition for reasonable
efforts, or perhaps due to the bureaucratic difficulties which plague
government agencies, 0 the goals of the CWA were never achieved.
44. Shotton, supra note 32, at 255.
45. Id. at 254-55. The "child rescue philosophy" sought "to insure that no child
was left in an unsafe situation. While well-intentioned, this philosophy often doomed
children to years of drift in foster care, with little or no hope of being placed in a
permanent home." Id. at 255.
46. For an in-depth look at the reasonable efforts requirement, see Shotton, supra
note 32.
47. See Guggenheim, Children in Foster Care, supra note 30, at 123 ("To be eligi-
ble for federal reimbursement under the Act, states are now required to provide pre-
ventive and reunification services geared to keeping families together before and after
state intrusion."); Shotton, supra note 32, at 227 ("The only ramification that Con-
gress intended was that the child welfare agency could not legally claim federal
matching funds for the child's stay in foster care pursuant to Title IV-E for that period
of time when a court found reasonable efforts to be lacking.").
48. Shotton, supra note 32, at 223.
49. Id. at 225. Some scholars attribute these difficulties to the lack of a clear defi-
nition of "reasonable efforts." See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 453-54;
Shotton, supra note 32, at 225. One author proposed the following three-step process
so that the child welfare agency could improve reasonable efforts determinations in
individual cases:
'he steps include: (1) identifying the exact danger that puts the child at risk
of placement and that justifies state intervention; (2) determining how the
family problems are causing or contributing to this danger to the child; and
(3) designing and providing services for the family that alleviate or diminish
the danger to the child. If any one of these steps is missing, it is unlikely that
the efforts made on behalf of the family will be reasonable.
Id. at 226. If implemented in this manner, it is clear that the reasonable efforts re-
quirement places a great burden on the shoulders of state child welfare agencies.
50. Not only are the agencies overburdened, but because the early 1980s marked
the beginning of the abuse of crack cocaine, the increase in drug abuse among poor
adults led to an inordinate number of families being processed through the child wel-
fare system. See Susan R. Larabee, Representing the Government in Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceeding, in Child Abuse and Neglect: Protecting the Child, Defending the
Parent, Representing the State, at 59, 64-65 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. C4-4183, 1988), available in WESTLAW, 148 PLI/Crim 59. This
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Although the CWA sought to reduce dependence on foster care as a
means of protecting children, in recent years, the number of children
in foster care has increased rather than decreased.5 1 In fact, approxi-
mately 600,000 children are currently part of the nation's foster care
system. 2 Furthermore, the average length of stay in foster care is
over two years53-- well above many child welfare experts' goals.-5 The
disappointing results of this much anticipated piece of legislation in-
fluenced Congress to pass the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
199755 ("ASF") which again aspires to achieve permanency for chil-
dren where the CWA failed. 6
Created partly out of a concern that "too many children in this
country are spending the most important formative years in a legal
sudden flood of cases was, most likely, more than Congress had bargained for when it
enacted the CWA.
51. See 142 Cong. Rec. S5710 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine)
("Tonight... almost 421,000 children will sleep in foster homes. Over a year's time,
659,000 will be in a foster home for at least part of the year."). In New York City
alone, the number of children admitted to foster care services was 7949 in 1995, 8912
in 1996, and 11,158 in 1997. Watching the Numbers, Child Welfare Watch, Winter
1997, at 11. Thus, in 1997, admissions to foster care rose twenty-five percent above
the previous year's statistics in New York City. Id. Similarly, the foster care popula-
tion in Illinois recently soared thirty percent above that in the previous year over a
fourteen month period. Richard Wexler, There is No Child Protection Without Family
Preservation, Tampa Tribune, Oct. 29, 1997, at 15, available in LEXIS, News ibrary.
52. Jill Sheldon, Note, 50,000 Children Are Waiting: Permanency Planning and
Termination of Parental Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980, 17 B.C. Third World LJ. 73, 73 (1997).
53. 143 Cong. Rec. S3898 (daily ed. May 1, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine). In
New York City, for example, the 1997 statistic for the average number of years that
children spent in foster care was 4.28 years. Watching the Numbers, Child Welfare
Watch, Winter 1997, at 11.
54. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette et al., We Knowi' Better Than We Do: A Policy
Framework for Child Welfare Reform, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 93, 98 (1997) ("In
1991, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation ... created its Families for Kids Initiative with a
vision of obtaining a permanent home within one year for all children in foster
care.").
55. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
56. Much of the talk surrounding the Adoption and Safe Families Act focused on
the CWA's failure to adequately define reasonable efforts. See supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text. Disgusted with the family preservation philosophy that generally
gives all families the benefit of the doubt, legislators blamed the murky "reasonable
efforts" requirement for the courts' and the agencies' attempts to reunite even the
most troubled families:
Why do [children] spend so many years in foster care? One reason is that, in
some of these cases, the child protective services feel hemmed in by a misin-
terpretation of a Federal law, a well-intentioned Federal law that this Con-
gress passed in 1980, a law that has done a great deal of good, but a law that
contains one provision that I believe has caused a great deal of harm and has
caused a great deal of confusion.... In other words... no matter what the
particular circumstances of a household may be, the State must make rea-
sonable efforts to keep that household, that family together, and then to put
it back together if it falls apart.
143 Cong. Rec. S3898 (daily ed. May 1, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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limbo,' 57 the ASF seeks to speed up the entire child welfare process.
Among other things, the ASF mandates that permanency hearings,5 8
required by the CWA to be conducted no later than eighteen months
after a child was placed into foster care, now must be held within
twelve months of a child's placement.59 This change is particularly
significant for the child's parent, for permanency hearings determine
"whether a child is to be returned to her parents in a relatively short
period, or whether a petition to terminate parental rights will be
filed."'60 Therefore, parents involved in child protective proceedings
who wish to reunite with their children must now "fix" whatever situa-
tions triggered their families' involvement in the child welfare system
even sooner than before.61
In addition to altering the time lines in child protective cases, the
ASF also significantly changes the general philosophy under which
Congress passed the CWA:62 Rather than focusing on family preser-
vation, this new legislation "emphasizes that the health and safety of
children must be the paramount concerns in determining reasonable
efforts to preserve and reunite the families of maltreated children. 6 3
Much of this backlash against family preservation stems from commu-
nity outrage when news of horrible acts of child abuse hits the news-
papers.6' For example, lobbying for the passage of the ASF, one
senate member told Congress the story of extreme abuse of an eight
year old boy by his aunt in October 1997.65 Using this tragedy as an
example of the danger of the family preservation philosophy, the sen-
ator remarked: "Don't we have to ask ... what on Earth was that
woman doing taking care of that child? Why in the world was that
57. 142 Cong. Rec. S5710 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
58. A permanency hearing is "a special type of review hearing that represents a
deadline to determine the final direction of the case." Duquette et al., supra note 54,
at 135.
59. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 302(2), 111
Stat. 2115, 2128.
60. Duquette et al., supra note 54, at 135. For a discussion of termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings, see infra note 132.
61. For a discussion of what parents need to do to regain permanent custody of
their children, see infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
62. Highlighting the rationale behind the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
one of the senators supporting this piece of legislation told Congress: "[I]t's time we
recognize that some families simply cannot and should not be kept together," 143
Cong. Rec. S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
63. Douglas H. Reiniger, Law Affecting Children and Families: 1997 Legislative
Review, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1998, at 1; see also Gail Vida Hamburg, An Act of Compas-
sion May Require Some Decisive Actions to Make it Work, Chi. Trib., Jan. 4, 1998,
§ 13, at 1 ("The legislation deviates from previous national child-welfare policy, which
had a goal of the ultimate reunification of abused and neglected children with their
parents.").
64. To support the passage of the ASF, Senator DeWine of Ohio offered specific
and graphic examples of six severe child abuse tragedies in large cities across the
nation. 142 Cong. Rec. S5710 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
65. 143 Cong. Rec. S11,175 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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child put back into that same home, put back with that abusive
woman?"66
Accordingly, the ASF, which shortens the time that families have to
work toward reunification and speeds up the termination of parental
rights and adoption processes, was passed largely in reaction to the
most terrible cases of child abuse in our nation.67 While concern for
the safety and well-being of the nation's children is a laudable goal,
the ASF may actually harm some children in the process: Because
this new piece of federal legislation mainly contemplates cases of se-
vere child abuse and maltreatment,68 poor families who are in the
child welfare system because of suspected neglect may soon be
ignored.69
Cases that involve poverty as neglect are perhaps the most compel-
ling candidates for family preservation and reunification services."
Unfortunately, poverty is also a deeply-rooted problem and, thus, one
that cannot be alleviated quickly.7" As such, the ASF's new time-lines
for child protective cases may actually work to tear apart families who
would otherwise have succeeded in rebuilding their lives.'
66. Id- The Senator went on to conclude: "[T]here are too many children in this
country today being returned to the care of people who have already abused and
battered them .... ." Id.
67. Throughout the debates over the passage of the ASF, proponents of the Act
clearly articulated that the legislation aimed at the most abusive and harmful families.
See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S12,669 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (recording Senator
DeWme's disapproval of using the "reasonable efforts" requirement to reunite all
families: "I am speaking now of dangerous, abusive adults who represent a threat to
the health and safety and even the lives of these children").
68. As further evidence of Congress's focus on cases of severe child abuse, the
ASF includes an exception to the "reasonable efforts" requirement when the child has
been subjected to "aggravating circumstances." Such circumstances are to be defined
by state law, but Congress suggests that they may include "abandonment, torture,
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse." Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L
No. 105-89, § 101(a)(D)(i), 111 Stat. 2115, 2116.
69. Critics of the new legislation argue that, although Congress has focused solely
on relieving some of the suffering that children endure at the hands of abusive par-
ents, actually "most children in foster care are there not because they were beaten,
abused or abandoned, as many reports have stated, but for neglect, mostly lack of
supervision." Hamburg, supra note 63, at 2. As a result, "[t]he legislation [which]
appears to be a carefully deliberated and efficient solution to the plight of abused
children . . . fails to address the larger social issues [like poverty] that cause child
abuse and neglect in the first place." Id.
70. See infra Part II (discussing the problem of poverty as neglect).
71. See John Gibeaut, Home For Keeps, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 60, 60 (1997)
(stating that, although Congress wants the child welfare system to arrive at perma-
nency quickly, parents nevertheless need a reasonable time to correct their lives and
to make their homes safe for their children); Daniel L. McCarthy, Anticipated Effects
of New Procedural Rules and Statutory Changes in Abuse and Neglect Cases, W. Va.
Law., July 1997, at 14, 14 (1997) (observing that one of the problems with narrowing
the time periods during which parents may work to rebuild their lives is that it under-
standably takes time for parents to change their circumstances).
72. See Hamburg, supra note 63, at 2 (remarking that the ASF "will be most effec-
tive when applied to families that should very clearly not be reunited" and, as such,
19981 2293
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Accordingly, poor parents involved in child protective proceedings
are in more dire need of effective and competent legal representation
today than ever before. With a philosophy throughout the child wel-
fare system that is presumptively against their hopes of reuniting with
their children,73 with the media's watchful eye on incidents of child
abuse and neglect,7 4 and with less time in which to effect significant
changes in their lives, parents in poverty need effective advocacy at all
stages of child protective proceedings.
II. FAMILIES IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE: POVERTY As NEGLECT
Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, families will
need great assistance during neglect proceedings.7 5 The great major-
ity of cases that child welfare agencies address "involve charges of
neglect against parents who have allegedly failed to care properly for
their children. '7 6 Furthermore, families involved in neglect proceed-
ings are overwhelmingly poor.77 Knowing that the families who come
critics "worry about the impact of the law on the huge class of children brought into
the system for neglect").
73. See Dale Russakoff, Against the Odds, a Failed Mother Returns to Her Chil-
dren, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1998, at Al (reporting the successful story of a reunited
family "that probably shouldn't even be a family under the new federal rules of child
protection").
74. For example, one of the most highly publicized incidents of child abuse in Illi-
nois was the story of three year old Joseph Wallace. See Phillip J. O'Connor & Zay N.
Smith, Woman Charged in Son's Hanging, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 20, 1993, at 3, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library. The young boy was hanged by his mentally ill mother
after being returned to her custody for a third time. Id. Seriously mentally ill, Jo-
seph's mother "ha[d] a history of beating her children, mutilating herself and setting
fires." Id. As a result of this tragic failing of the child welfare system, many critics
lashed out against the family preservation philosophy, arguing that violent and unsta-
ble parents should not regain custody of their children. See Editorial, "Family First"
Policy Is a Failure at DCFS, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 21, 1993, at 31, available in LEXIS,
News Library ("This tragic tale is further evidence of what we have been saying for
some time: State law and practice, which puts 'families first,' ahead of a child's safety,
must be changed.").
75. See, e.g., Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests
of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 79, 130 (1997) ("[Nleglect
tends to be the most deeply embedded and difficult [child protection case] to treat, so
these parents need to get working as quickly as possible.").
76. Myths and Facts: The Big Picture, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 7. In
1995, state child protective services' investigations determined that 52 percent of chil-
dren in the child protective system for maltreatment were there due to allegations of
parental neglect. National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, In
Fact... : Answers to Frequently Asked Questions on Child Abuse and Neglect (visited
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/infact.htm>.
77. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 31, at 888 ("Perhaps the most prevalent character-
istic of families charged with neglect is poverty .... "); Weinstein, supra note 75, at 130
("[T]hese parents are often among the most unempowered people in our society.
They tend to be poor, often on some kind of welfare . . ., relatively socially isolated,
and often with no support system."); Does Child Welfare Devalue the Family?, Child
Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 2 ("[The child welfare system] is a system for poor
2294 [Vol. 66
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS
through their doors are principally afflicted with poverty,"8 child wel-
fare agencies-commissioned to help children and families-must be-
gin to "address[] poverty as an underlying cause of family
problems."79
The agencies, however, are often criticized for confusing poverty
with neglect. Rather than appreciating families' hardships, child wel-
fare agencies are sometimes accused of charging parents with neglect
when, in fact, poverty is the real problem:' °
First and foremost [parents accused of neglect] are poor. Food,
jobs, and decent housing are elusive. Five sisters may live together
with their fifteen children in a roach infested slum: their only other
housing option being a roach infested apartment in a public housing
high-rise where their children will be in daily danger of being shot
or "shaken down." Because they live where they do, the state
charges these mothers with neglect for subjecting their children to
an injurious environment.81
Thus, in order to effectively help families who come into the child
protection system, child welfare agencies must be keenly aware of the
many variables that affect a family's particular circumstances.
Although a better appreciation of families' situations on the part of
child welfare officials could avoid the filing of some neglect petitions
in the first instance, 2 statutory definitions of neglect may force agen-
cies to file petitions where, perhaps, they otherwise would not.s' For
example, "[p]overty is associated with insufficient, unsafe housing and
families, single-parent families, families who are homeless or whose parents are sub-
stance abusers or infected with HIV.").
78. One commentator notes that the parent's lawyer in neglect proceedings must
be keenly aware that her client's poverty is her principal affliction and, as such, should
focus the case more on the client's need for services and support than on the underly-
ing allegations of maltreatment. Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation
of Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1621, 1646-48 (1996).
79. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 169.
80. See Leroy H. Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness. in
The Social Context of Child Abuse and Neglect 23, 35 (Leroy H. Pelton ed., 1981)
("[S]ome mothers are caught up in difficult and dangerous situations that have less to
do with their adequacy and responsibility as parents than with the hard circumstances
of their lives.").
81. Appell, supra note 25, at 585 (citation omitted).
82. For an explanation of filing petitions against parents and commencing legal
proceedings in child protective cases, see infra part III.A.
83. See Appell, supra note 25, at 605 ("[The line between neglect and poverty...
is uncomfortably blurry ...."). Definitions of neglect vary slightly from state to state.
In New York, for example, a "neglected child" is defined in part as:
a child less than eighteen years of age (i) whose physical, mental or emo-
tional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent.. . to exercise a minimum
degree of care (A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter or education... or medical... care, though financially able to do so or
offered financial or other reasonable means to do so; or... (ii) who has been
abandoned.., by his parents ....
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983). In Colorado, a child is neglected if:
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even homelessness. Poverty is linked with poor nutrition, a lack of
medical care, inadequate daycare, poor educational facilities, and psy-
chological feelings of helplessness and stress. Any one of these condi-
tions could support an allegation of specific harm. '8 4 Because the
definition of neglect encompasses many circumstances that are a di-
rect result of poverty,85 child welfare agencies may have no choice but
to intervene in poor families' lives. In fact, state intervention in a fam-
ily's life where the supposed "neglect" actually stems from the fam-
ily's economic situation may be necessary to help the family. 6 If
intervention is focused on protective services rather than punitive
measures, then the child welfare agency can make a positive differ-
ence in troubled families' lives.87
Even if the agency's intervention is sensitive to issues of poverty,
though, poor families will still face significant challenges. The cycle of
poverty, indeed, is difficult for any family to break.88 Their economic
situations make it incredibly hard for indigent parents to convince
child welfare agencies that the conditions that led to the neglect
charge will not continue once the family is reunited: Because there is
much less room for error in poor families, virtually any small set-back
can trigger another allegation of neglect.89 Furthermore, the same de-
A parent... has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mis-
treatment or abuse or a parent . . . has suffered or allowed another to mis-
treat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such
mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring;... The child's environ-
ment is injurious to his or her welfare; ... The child is homeless, without
proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent... through no fault of
such parent ....
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-102 (1997). In contrast to New York and Colorado's defini-
tions which, at least in theory, prevent basing a finding of neglect on poverty alone,
Indiana's statute does not make this concession for parents in poverty:
A child is [neglected] if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously
endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's par-
ent ... to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, education, or supervision.
Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-1-1 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
84. Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 461.
85. Id. at 462; Kindred, supra note 24, at 532.
86. For a discussion of state intervention into families' lives, see infra part IV.C.
87. Cf Appell, supra note 25, at 610 (arguing for an approach to child welfare
issues that focuses on strengthening and protecting the parent-child relationship);
Boyer, supra note 78, at 1648-49 (noting the argument that public agencies should
offer services that might avoid the need for placing children away from their families).
88. See generally Lisbeth B. Schorr, Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of
Disadvantage (1989) (explaining the risks associated with living in poverty and pro-
posing solutions aimed at easing the difficulties families face when trying to lift them-
selves out of poverty).
89. Leroy Pelton observes:
Neglectful irresponsibility more readily leads to dire consequences when it
occurs in the context of poverty than when that same behavior is engaged in
by middle-class parents. In middle-class families there is some leeway for
irresponsibility, a luxury that poverty does not afford. A middle-class
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ficiencies that initially led to the charges of neglect-such as poor
housing, lack of child care, lack of transportation, and stress-can
make complying with the child welfare agency's service plan ex-
tremely difficult.90 Nevertheless, such compliance is critical to reuni-
fying and preserving the family unit.91
Finally, charges of neglect effectively render poor parents power-
less. 2 The strain of having one's children taken away is extremely
distressing for parents in poverty, who are often undereducated and
unworldly.93 This stressful situation weakens parents and, therefore,
further exacerbates the imbalance of power that already favors the
state in child protection proceedings.94 The state is clearly in control
in neglect proceedings, for not only does it present the case to the
court, but its "adversary," the parent, is unfamiliar with the intricacies
of the legal proceedings. 95 As such, parents are often unable to effec-
tively assert their rights. 96
Given the imbalance of power in child protection cases, parents'
inability to adequately represent their own interests, child welfare
agencies' practical limitations, and all of the problems that poverty
adds to this equation, it is clear that lawyers for parents are essential
players in neglect proceedings. In addition to these difficulties that
poor parents face, the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 199797 may make those parents' interactions with the child welfare
system even more difficult. Without effective advocates, then, poor
families in child protective proceedings are certainly at risk.
mother can be careless with her money and squander some of it, but still
have enough so that her children will not be deprived of basic necessities.
Identical lapses in responsibility on the part of an impoverished mother
might cause her children to go hungry during the last few days of the month.
The less money one has, the better manager of money one has to be.
Pelton, supra note 80, at 34-35 (citations omitted).
90. Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the Parent
in Child Dependency Proceedings, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1079. 1083 (1988).
91. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
92. Parents on the Periphery, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 7.
93. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the hardships that indi-
gent parents face in court when it wrote: "The parents are likely to be people with
little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with life, and who are,
at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation. That these factors
may combine to overwhelm an uncounseled parent is evident ...." Lassiter v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981).
94. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 102.
95. See Kim Nauer, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, City Limits, Nov. 1994, at 20, 22(quoting the director of an organization that helps families deal with the child welfare
bureaucracy as saying, "[e]verybody [in family court] uses a lot of shorthand, lingo
and court terms. By the end of the day, the parents are not really quite clear what has
happened").
96. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is MVy Client,
But Who Am I?," 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1917, 1949 (1996).
97. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
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III. THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS IN
NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
This part reviews the procedures in most child neglect cases, dis-
cusses states' provisions of court-appointed counsel to indigent par-
ents charged with neglect, and highlights some of the shortcomings in
the legal representation currently afforded to such parents.
A. Typical Steps In Child Protection Matters
Because child protection matters are conducted similarly through-
out the country, a discussion of these proceedings has widespread ap-
plicability.98 Accordingly, the following explanation of the procedure
in New York child protective cases can appropriately be generalized
to most such systems.99
Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act governs the proce-
dures in child protective proceedings. Its purpose is two-fold: (1) "to
establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreat-
ment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-
being;" and (2) "to provide a due process of law for determining when
the state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of
a parent on behalf of a child."' 0'
Child protection proceedings are usually commenced when a report
of suspected child abuse or neglect is called into the state central reg-
ister 10 Once a report is referred to a child protective agency, that
office must immediately begin to investigate the allegations in the re-
port.102 This investigation by child protective services marks the be-
98. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25 (discussing procedures and failings of the child
protection system in general); Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Fam-
ily Support to Succeed, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 311 (1996) (discussing the
child dependency legal system in general and noting its shortcomings); Bernadine
Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1 (1995) (focusing on problems in the Illinois child protection
system and analogizing those problems to mothers in poverty in general); Jeanine L.
English & Michael R. Tritz, In Support of the Family: Family Preservation as an Alter-
native to Foster Care, Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev., Winter 1992-93, at 183 (discussing the
California child welfare system and applying its discussion to systems in most other
states); Garcia & Batey, supra note 90 (documenting findings of a study of the Florida
child dependency system and applying them to other child protective systems
throughout the country); Weinstein, supra note 75 (analyzing the problems and fail-
ings of child protection matters in general).
99. Referring to the New York Family Court Act, current Family Court Judge Su-
san R. Larabee stressed that: "New York's statute has been a model for other states
and other countries." Larabee, supra note 50, at 69.
100. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1011 (McKinney 1983).
101. Larabee, supra note 50, at 103.
102. New York Social Services Law provides that the child protective service shall:
commence or cause the appropriate society for the prevention of cruelty to
children to commence, within twenty-four hours, an appropriate investiga-
tion which shall include an evaluation of the environment of the child named
in the report and any other children in the same home and a determination
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ginning of the state's intervention into a family's life.0 3 Generally,
the investigation may have three possible outcomes. First, the report
of alleged child maltreatment may be deemed "unfounded."" Sec-
ond, if the child protective agency determines that the family is truly
in need of assistance, the agency must offer appropriate services to the
family-"0 5 These services are designed, at least in theory, as protective
and preventive measures to lift a troubled family out of a difficult situ-
ation.10 6 And third, if the agency determines that preventive services
will not suffice to help a family, then the agency may remove a child
from her home and place her in protective custody.1 07
A child may be removed from her family upon the written consent
of her parent,10 8 upon an order from the family court directing her
temporary removal, 109 or, in an emergency situation, without a court
of the. . . nature, extent and cause of any condition enumerated in such
report... and, after seeing to the safety of the child or children, forthwith
notify the subjects of the report... of the existence of the report and their
respective rights ....
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(6) (McKinney 1992); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 328
(West 1984) (providing that a probation officer shall immediately commence an inves-
tigation to determine whether child welfare services should be offered to the family or
whether court proceedings should be commenced); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-312(1)
(1997) (providing that the court must immediately investigate reports of abuse to de-
termine whether a child needs further protection and whether to authorize the filing
of a petition); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4903(1) (1991) (providing that the department
of child welfare services shall investigate all complaints of neglect, abuse, or abandon-
ment of children).
103. Experts in child welfare, however, note that the government's involvement in
poor families' lives is not limited to when it acts on reports of supposed maltreatment.
For example, one commentator writes:
[P]oor families lead more public lives than their middle-class counterparts:
rather than visiting private doctors, poor families are likely to attend public
clinics and emergency rooms for routine medical care; rather than hiring
contractors to fix their homes, poor families encounter public building in-
spectors; rather than using their cars to run errands, poor mothers use public
transportation.
Appell, supra note 25, at 584 (citation omitted).
104. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(7) (McKinney 1992); cf Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-
501(1)(a) (1997) (alloving the option that no further action be taken).
105. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424.10 (McKinney 1997); see W. Va. Code § 49-6A-9
(1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.57(1)(a) (West 1997); cf Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4903(2)
(1991) (providing that Human Services may provide aid and services to allow children
to remain in their homes).
106. See generally The Assault on Preventive Senices, Child Welfare Watch, Spring
1997, at 4 (stressing the importance of offering preventive services to families in need
and criticizing some of the shortcomings in administering appropriate and effective
services to families).
107. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 1021-29 (McKinney 1983); see Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code § 361(c) (Vest 1984); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2309 (1997); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-301 (Supp. 1997).
108. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1021 (McKinney 1983); see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.63(1)
(West 1997).
109. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022 (McKinney 1983); see S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-736
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.34.050 (Vest 1993); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 48.19(1)(c) (West 1997).
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order.' After a child is removed from her family, the child protec-
tive agency will file a petition with the family court reporting the facts
surrounding the parent's alleged neglect or abuse."' From this stage
forward, three different parties are involved in the proceedings and
are represented individually by separate lawyers: The government, 1 1 2
the child," 3 and the respondent parent." 4 The family court will then
preside over a "fact-finding hearing,""' 5 during which the court will
determine if the child has been abused or neglected. This hearing is
the family court equivalent of a trial: It is the most adversarial stage
of the proceedings 1 6 and, therefore, one of many times throughout
the proceedings when an attorney's presence is clearly necessary to
ensure that the parent's rights are adequately represented.
At the fact-finding hearing, if the court finds that the facts in the
petition are insufficient to sustain the allegations made against the
parent, then the court must dismiss the petition." 7 If, however, the
court makes a finding of abuse or neglect, then the court will decide
what will happen to the child at a dispositional hearing.",8 At the dis-
110. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1024 (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998); see Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-3-401 (1997); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2309(3) (1997); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-610
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). An emergency situation only exists when an authorized
individual:
has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in such circumstance or con-
dition that his continuing in said place of residence or in the care and cus-
tody of the parent ... presents an imminent danger to the child's life or
health; and there is not enough time to apply for an order under section one
thousand twenty-two [of the Family Court Act].
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1024 (a)(i) & (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
111. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1031(a) (McKinney 1983); see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 325 (West 1984); Colo. Rev. Code § 19-3-501(2) (1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.25
(West 1997).
112. See generally Larabee, supra note 50 (exploring the attorney's duty in repre-
senting the government in these situations).
113. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 241-49(a) & 1016 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997-1998);
see S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-110(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
266(A) (Michie Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.23(1) (West 1997).
114. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 262(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998) (establishing
the indigent parent's right to court-appointed counsel in child abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings); see also infra Part III.B (describing court-appointed counsel offered to indi-
gent parents in various states). The word "respondent" refers to "any parent or other
person legally responsible for a child's care who is alleged to have abused or ne-
glected such child." N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(a) (McKinney 1983).
115. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1044 (McKinney 1983); see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 334
(West 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-505 (1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.31 (West 1997).
116. Lisa A. Granik, Representing Parents in Child Protection Cases 7 (1988).
117. N.Y. Fam Ct. Act § 1051(c) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998); see Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code § 356 (West 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-505(6) (1997); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 37-1-129(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
118. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(b)-(c) (West 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-
507 (1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129(c) (Supp. 1997); see also Granik, supra note
116, 8-10 (explaining the goals of the dispositional hearing and the crucial role that
the lawyer for the respondent parent plays at this point in the proceedings).
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positional hearing, the court will frequently place the child away from
her parents, either with a relative'19 or into foster care. 20
After a child has been placed into foster care, the child's parent
must work diligently and assume great responsibility in order to
regain custody of her child. A child may be placed into foster care for
an initial period of up to one year.' 2 ' Once a child is in foster care, an
authorized agency must assess the family's situation and establish and
maintain a family service plan based on this assessment.12 This ser-
vice plan will require that the parent obtain specific services and com-
plete specific programs"23 and will provide for the parent's visitation
with her child. Although social services officials are required to con-
sult with the parent in preparing the family's service plan,1 24 in reality
very few parents attend service plan meetings"as because they do not
know their rights. 26 A parent's failure to participate in these meet-
ings is both unfortunate and contrary to her interests: The parent's
119. For a discussion of kinship foster care, see generally Kinship Foster Care in
Steep Decline, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 3.
120. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1055(a) (McKinney 1983); see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 361(e) (West 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a)(2)(c) (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
33, § 4903(4) (1991). New York Social Services Law defines foster care as: "care
provided a child in a foster family free or boarding home, group home, agency board-
ing home, child care institution, health care facility or any combination thereof." N.Y.
Soc. Serv. § 392(1)(a) (McKinney 1992).
121. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998); see Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-312(1) (Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code § 49-68 (Supp. 1997). Beyond that
initial first year, the court may conduct a hearing to further extend the child's place-
ment in foster care. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055(b)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1983 & Supp.
1997-1998); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-312(1) (Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code § 49-6-8
(Supp. 1997). At these extension of placement hearings, the court looks to, among
other things, whether the respondent parent complied with the child services plan.
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055(b)(iv)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
122. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-e(1)-(2) (McKinney 1992); see W. Va. Code § 49-
6D-3 (1996).
123. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-e(2) (McKinney 1992); see W. Va. Code § 49.6D-
3(a) (1996).
124. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-e(2) (McKinney 1992); see W. Va. Code § 49-6D-
3(b) (1996).
125. See Parents on the Periphery, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 6 (noting
that, although New York social services regulations require that caseworkers seek
parental input in their children's service plan, these regulations are rarely adhered to
and, in fact, nonprofit foster care agencies concede that agency caseworkers fre-
quently resist parent participation). Child Welfare Watch also notes:
According to a May 1994 audit of case records by the New York State
Comptroller's Office, parents did not participate in 79 percent of semi-an-
nual service plan review meetings.. . even though this is specifically re-
quired by state regulation. In the majority of these cases, parents were not
notified of these meetings.
Id.
126. Martin Guggenheim, Proposal for a Family Advocacy Project 4-5 [hereinafter
Guggenheim, Proposal] (on file with the Fordhan Law Review).
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active participation in this process and frequent visitation with her
child are crucial to her child's expedient return home.
127
At all times throughout these proceedings, the child welfare agency
asserts great power and control over the parent: The agency seeks to
convince the family court judge that the parent has mistreated her
child, is fully responsible for creating the service plan imposed upon
the family, and has the ultimate ability to authorize a child's return
home. 128 As such, child protective proceedings place the parent in a
delicate position: She is both pitted against the agency as its adversary
in court and forced to comply graciously and cooperatively with
whatever plan the agency sets forth.129 Clearly, then, the parent is in
great need of effective assistance of counsel after the dispositional
phase of the case in order to overcome these systemic hurdles that
stand in the way of regaining custody of her children. 3 °
B. The Lawyer For The Respondent Parent
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "a parent's de-
sire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably
warrants deference and ... protection,"" 3' it has also ruled that indi-
gent parents have no constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in
non-criminal proceedings. 3 2 Nevertheless, many states grant parents
127. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 98, at 336 ("Visitation constitutes a crucial element
of reunification. Arranging immediate and frequent visits for children, beginning in
the first weeks after removal, appears to be the best way to ensure successful reunifi-
cation."). For further discussion of the importance of visitation between parents and
their children while they are in foster care, see infra notes 293-95 and accompanying
text.
128. See Nauer, supra note 95, at 23.
129. See Boyer, supra note 78, at 1648.
130. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1090-91 ("[T]he representation of par-
ents by legal services attorneys is crucial in order to put a 'damper' on [the child
welfare agency] which would otherwise 'ride roughshod over parents."').
131. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (citations
omitted).
132. In Lassiter, the Supreme Court refused to hold that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents
in all termination of parental rights proceedings. Id. at 31-32. Termination proceed-
ings have more severe and permanent consequences than the child protective pro-
ceedings considered in this Note. The connection between the two, however, is very
important. If a child welfare agency finds that, despite its diligent efforts to encourage
and strengthen a parent's relationship with her child, the parent nevertheless has
failed repeatedly to improve her relationship with her child, then that agency may file
a petition to terminate parental rights. See, e.g., N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 614 (McKinney
1983) (stating that a petition for permanent termination of parental rights may be
filed if the parent "has failed ... substantially and continuously or repeatedly to main-
tain contact with or plan for the future of the child"). Once a court terminates paren-
tal rights, guardianship and custody of the child is committed to the child welfare
agency, thereby freeing the child for adoption. See, e.g., id. § 634. Thus, to avoid the
filing of a termination petition and potentially losing custody of her child perma-
nently, a respondent parent in child protective proceedings must work quickly and
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a statutory right to counsel in child protective proceedings.13- Some
states, however, provide for only a limited right to counsel." The
duration, scope, and quality of the court-appointed representation af-
forded to indigent parents, therefore, varies greatly from state to state.
In many states, the court appoints counsel to indigent parents once
they appear in court on neglect petitions. 35 In these states, the re-
spondent parent will not have met her attorney before she has to ap-
pear in court for the first time. Other courts may appoint counsel for
parents before their first court appearances. 3 6 This early appoint-
ment may give the parent the opportunity to speak to her attorney
prior to meeting the judge.
Court-appointed counsel will typically represent an indigent parent
"at all critical stages of the proceedings."'' 37 What states consider
"critical," however, varies greatly. For example, in New York, the du-
ties of an indigent parent's court-appointed attorney end after the dis-
deliberately to maintain continual contact with her child and to plan for the future of
her child. Importantly, the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
increases the speed at which respondent parents must work to rebuild their lives.
Under this new law, a termination of parental rights petition must be filed, except in
certain cases, when a child had been under the state's supervision for fifteen months
out of the most recent twenty-two months. Children's Defense Fund, Summary of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, H.R. 867, at 2 (1997).
133. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317 (West 1997); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2304
(1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 29 (Law. Co-op. 1997); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8A3
(West Supp. 1996); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 262 (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
134. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-4-3(b) (Michie 1997) ("The court may ap-
point counsel to represent any parent in [non-termination of parental rights proceed-
ings]." (emphasis added)); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.211(4) (West 1997) (providing that
counsel may only be appointed to parents in child protective proceedings if the court
finds three prerequisites: "(1) That the [parent] is indigent; and (2) That the [parent]
desires the appointment of counsel; and (3) That a full and fair hearing requires ap-
pointment of counsel for the [parent].").
Similarly, in J.S.S. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 6S0 So. 2d
548,549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), a Florida court held that an indigent parent is only
entitled to appointed counsel in child protective proceedings on a case-by-case basis.
Relying on factors from Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1975), the court
found that indigent parents in Florida have only a limited right to counsel in non-
termination of parental rights and non-criminal cases.
135. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 353 (West 1997); Iowa Code § 232.89(1)
(West Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-201(2) (1997); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1033-
b (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
136. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-316(e) (Michie 1998) ("Appointment of coun-
sel shall be made at a time sufficiently in advance of the court appearance to allow
adequate preparation by appointed counsel and adequate consultation between the
appointed counsel and the client."); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 29 (Law. Co-op.
1994) (providing that the court must appoint counsel for indigent parents within four-
teen days of the filing of the petition against the parent); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266(C)
(Michie Supp. 1997) (providing that indigent parents must be informed of their right
to counsel prior to the initial hearing by the court).
137. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2304(b)(1) (1997); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 317(d) (West 1997) ("The counsel appointed by the court shall represent the parent




positional phase of the proceedings. 3 ' Accordingly, once the family
court makes a finding of neglect against the respondent, the court-
appointed attorney's responsibilities cease, leaving the parent to re-
build her family's life on her own. Alternatively, in California, a
court-appointed attorney must continue to represent her indigent cli-
ent throughout the proceedings. 139 Thus, while an indigent parent in
New York must negotiate and cooperate with the child welfare agency
on her own, 40 indigent parents in California are assisted by counsel at
every step in the process.
Finally, the compensation afforded to court-appointed attorneys dif-
fers from state to state.14  Some states pay court-appointed attorneys
a flat rate. In California, for example, attorneys appointed to repre-
sent indigent parents are compensated at a rate of $760 per appoint-
ment.142 In other states, court-appointed attorneys are paid by the
hour. For example, New York143 and Hawaii 144 both set hourly rates
that distinguish between in-court time and out-of-court time. In states
that make such distinctions, then, court-appointed attorneys are often
paid more for sitting in the courthouse and waiting for their cases than
they are paid for preparing for those court appearances. 145
138. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1052-b (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998) (providing that, after
disposition, counsel's only remaining duty is to advise the respondent parent of her
right to appeal).
139. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(d) (West 1997) ("Counsel shall continue to rep-
resent the parent... unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other coun-
sel or for cause."). California courts have interpreted this statute very strictly and
have found that indigent parents have an enforceable statutory right to counsel in all
proceedings. For example, in Tanya H. v. Toby B., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503 (Ct. App.
1993), the court considered a California juvenile court's policy memorandum which
provided that, due to fiscal difficulties, court-appointed attorneys were generally to be
relieved following the first review of the child's permanency plan. Finding that the
child protective process contemplates active involvement of counsel for parents, the
court held that the policy memorandum was inconsistent with the statute that explic-
itly provides for appointed counsel for indigent parents in all proceedings. Id. at 505-
06.
140. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (describing the many tasks for
parents after the dispositional phase of the case).
141. For a critique of the very low rates paid to court-appointed attorneys, see infra
part III.C.4.
142. See Amarawansa v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 251
(Ct. App. 1996) (noting the change in compensation rates for court-appointed attor-
neys representing indigent parents from an hourly rate to a flat rate).
143. See N.Y. County Law § 722-b (McKinney 1991) (providing that court-ap-
pointed counsel for respondent parents in New York County will be paid a rate not to
exceed forty dollars per hour for time spent in court and twenty-five dollars an hour
for time spent out of court).
144. See Faye T. Kimura, Paradise in the Making, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 79, 79(noting that court-appointed attorneys representing respondent parents in Hawaii are
paid a "nominal" fee of sixty dollars an hour for in-court time and forty dollars an
hour for out-of-court work).
145. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York voiced its concern about
the inadequate compensation rates paid to court-appointed attorneys:
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C. Deficiencies In The Current Legal Representation Afforded To
Indigent Parents
This part highlights some of the ways in which states' court-ap-
pointed counsel statutes can actually harm indigent parents' neglect
cases.
1. Many States Model Their Court-Appointed Representation For
Indigent Parents On Representation In The Criminal
Defense Context
In contrast to the popular discussion about the scope and adequacy
of the legal representation of children in child protective proceed-
ings,' 46 relatively little attention has similarly been paid to what con-
stitutes adequate and effective representation for the respondent
parent. Indeed, the states that do provide counsel for indigent parents
in neglect proceedings model this legal representation on criminal de-
fense practice rather than considering the unique aspects of child pro-
tective law: 147
[T]he courts and legislatures have unreflectively adapted the model
commonly used for representing accused criminal defendants. That
model is not well-suited to the special needs of families in crisis and
does not take into account the dramatically different ways in which
child protection cases are resolved in the legal system. 8
The "in-court"/"out-of-court" differential is particularly ironic in that much
"in-court" time may be spent waiting for a case to be called. Although such
passive "waiting" time does nothing to advance the indigent client's [case],
an attorney is better compensated for it than for time spent in even the most
significant out-of-court research and preparation.
Report of the Criminal Advocacy Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York Concerning Compensation of Counsel Assigned to Represent Indigent
Criminal Defendants in New York 7 n.3 (March 21, 1997) [hereinafter Compensation
of Counsel].
146. For example, from December 1-3, 1995, Fordham University School of Law
hosted a symposium titled "The Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Represen-
tation of Children." At the Conference, "more than seventy lawyers, judges, legal
scholars, and representatives of other professions worked together to develop and
adopt Recommendations to improve professional practices of lawyers who serve on
behalf of children." Bruce A. Green & Bernadine Dohrn, Foreward: Children and the
Ethical Practice of Law, 64 Fordhan L. Rev. 1281, 1283 (1996).
147. For example, the statute in New York that provides court-appointed counsel to
indigent parents in child protective proceedings was created in direct response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). which held
that indigent criminal defendants have a federal constitutional right to court-ap-
pointed counsel. See Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Child Abuse Cases, in
Helping the Battered Child and His Family 226 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Heifer
eds., 1972); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Task Force on the Representation of the
Indigent 3 (1997) [hereinafter Representation of the Indigent).
148. Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 2.
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For example, many states provide for their counties' public defenders
to represent indigent parents in neglect proceedings. 4 9 Though pub-
lic defenders certainly can provide excellent representation for crimi-
nal defendants, the issues in child protective proceedings are
extremely different from those in criminal cases. Thus, representation
by public defenders may not be sensitive to the unique interests in
neglect proceedings.
Perhaps the greatest difference between criminal cases and child
protective cases is the relative goal of each proceeding. 5 ' In criminal
cases, the focus is on what happened in the past. The goal, therefore,
is mainly to punish the defendant for her past wrongdoing. 51 In fam-
ily court, on the other hand, the proceedings are focused toward the
future.1 52 Rather than being concerned with blaming parents, 153 child
protective proceedings should focus on remedying the family.154 If
states began to reconsider the role of the lawyer in the child protective
149. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-821(c) (1995) (providing that
the Office of the Public Defender shall represent indigent parents in neglect proceed-
ings); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8:43(a) (West Supp. 1996) ("The court shall advise the
respondent [parent] that if he is indigent, he may apply for an attorney through the
Office of the Public Defender."); N.Y. County Law § 722(1) (McKinney 1991) (pro-
viding that public defenders may represent indigent parents in child protective pro-
ceedings); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.23(4) (West 1997) ("[T]he court shall refer the
[indigent parent] to the state public defender"). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-587
(1997) (stating that, in providing for counsel for indigent parents in neglect proceed-
ings, "[i]n no case may the judge appoint a ... public defender.").
150. See Isaacs, supra note 147, at 226 (noting the differences between criminal
cases and child protective cases and writing: "The avowed purpose [of child protec-
tive proceedings] . . . is not to adjudge and punish but rather to protect the child,
provide treatment for the parent and, ultimately, rehabilitate the family if possible.").
151. Comparing the criminal and the child protective systems, Jacob Isaacs notes:
"Normally in a criminal case, once the judge or jury had determined the issue of guilt
or innocence, the function of defense counsel ends .... In [child protective proceed-
ings], however, the finding of culpability may only be the beginning of the opportunity
for effective legal representation." Id. at 236.
152. Janet Weinstein states:
In the usual criminal or civil case, the court makes a finding about something
that has already occurred in order to decide who was "right," and thus, who
wins. Child protection [proceedings] ... are about the fitture welfare of the
child. Although past acts may provide some help in thinking about the wel-
fare of the child, they are not determinative. The family is a living entity,
dynamic in nature, involving personalities and relationships which will
change depending upon how the family is reordered .... The traditional legal
approach requires a snapshot judgment of the family structure which does
not serve the best interest of the child.
Weinstein, supra note 75, at 98 (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 130; Dohm, supra note 98, at 4-5.
154. Of course, many critics of the current child protective scheme argue that fam-
ily court matters are too adversarial and too often blame parents for their circum-
stances. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 98, at 314-18 (arguing that child welfare agencies
too often emphasize families' deficits and shortcomings rather than focusing on their
strengths and needs); Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1087 (noting that child wel-
fare agencies too often misperceive their goal in child protective cases which should
be "to reunite, not to wreck families").
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context instead of plugging criminal defense lawyers into child protec-
tive cases, then perhaps lawyers for indigent parents could better
serve families and work to protect children.""5
2. The Time At Which Courts Appoint Counsel To Indigent
Parents Often Leads To Unnecessary Delays In The
Court Proceedings
Because some states do not provide indigent parents with court-
appointed counsel until the first court date, 156 lawyers often have no
opportunity to meet with their clients beforehand to discuss their
cases. 57 As a result, lawyers typically request adjournments to give
themselves time to get acquainted with their clients and their particu-
lar circumstances. 158 Such adjournments, however, may have a detri-
mental effect on the outcome of the case, thereby hurting families.' 59
By placing court-appointed lawyers in difficult situations where they
are forced to seek adjournments, state statues that do not appoint
counsel until parents appear in court essentially force lawyers to stray
from Congress's stated goals of expedited cases and quicker perma-
nency for children.
3. Under Some States' Assigned Counsel Statutes, Attorneys
Abandon Indigent Parents When They Are Perhaps Most
In Need Of Advocacy
Some states determine that the appointment of the indigent par-
ent's lawyer is complete after the court enters a finding in the case."W
In cases where the court makes a finding of neglect, then, court-ap-
pointed counsel is relieved at the moment when the indigent parent is
155. Although the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 moves away from a pro-
family philosophy, supporters of the legislation nevertheless acknowledge that the
best way to protect a child is to keep her with her family: "There are some families
that need a little help if they are going to stay together, and it is right for us to help
them. Not only is it right-it is also clearly in the best interests of the child to reunite
families when we can." 142 Cong. Rec. S5711 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of
Sen. DeWine).
156. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
157. Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 5-6.
158. In an editorial arguing that the child welfare system keeps children in -limbo"
for too long and needs to be overhauled, one Connecticut paper writes: "[I]f lawyers
were appointed to represent the parents before the hearing instead of on the day of
the hearing, it could reduce the number of cases that are postponed to give counsel
time to prepare." Editorial, Children in Limbo, Hartford Courant, Oct. 15, 1997, at
A14, available in 1997 WL 14671265.
159. Noting that drawn-out delays in child protective proceedings may inappropri-
ately lead to a petition to terminate parental rights, the Chicago Tribune notes:
"[FIrequent continuances that move cases through the labyrinthine child-welfare sys-
tem at a snail's pace may mean that cases come up for termination before all avenues
to rehabilitate parents have been explored." Hamburg, supra note 63, at 2.
160. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1052-b (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
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most vulnerable.'61 After disposition, parents are at the mercy of the
child welfare agency.162 Parents must cooperate with the agency by
obtaining services, thereby proving to the agency that their children
may be safely returned home. 63 In light of Congress's renewed desire
to shorten the time during which a child is in foster care, parents will
need to obtain such services and to improve their lives more expedi-
ently than ever before if they hope to have their children returned to
them. Lawyers for parents are essential in this effort."6 Accordingly,
without the assistance of an advocate to navigate through the
overburdened bureaucracy of the country's child welfare agencies, 165
parents have less of a chance of complying with new federal guidelines
and goals.
4. The Rates Of Compensation For Court-Appointed Counsel Are
Often Inadequate
Critics of current assigned counsel programs argue that the low
rates paid for the services of court-appointed attorneys reflect the
legal profession's indifference toward providing appropriate and effec-
tive advocacy for the indigent.'66 Many argue that failing to pay
court-appointed attorneys well, or at least fairly, is one of the predom-
inant reasons why indigent clients do not always receive effective
assistance of counsel:167
161. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1100 (contending that the lawyer for the
parent in child protective proceedings has a crucial role to play after the court enters a
finding of neglect); Nauer, supra note 95, at 22 ("Parents lose their court-appointed
representation after the trial is over and have no one to turn to if they want to chal-
lenge agency actions while their child is in foster care.").
162. See Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 431, 439
(1996) (stating that children who are unfortunately hauled through the child protec-
tive system must have "a perception of their parents as the victims of an aggressive
bureaucracy"); Nauer, supra note 95, at 22 ("[Parents] have little or no hope of seeing
their children returned without [the child welfare agency's] nod.").
163. See Buss, supra note 162, at 433-34.
164. See Granik, supra note 116, at 9-10; Editorial, Of Parental Rights, Indianapolis
Star, Jan. 11, 1997, at A12.
165. Noting that parents have little choice but to work within the overburdened
and sometimes unresponsive child welfare agency, Kim Nauer writes: "Generally
speaking, a good advocate must find out what [the child welfare agency] wants and
help the parent meet these expectations." Nauer, supra note 95, at 23. The lawyer for
the parent must "just keep on negotiating [with the agency] until there's no further
opposition to returning the child." Id. (quoting Martin Guggenheim).
166. See, e.g., Representation of the Indigent, supra note 147, at 7 (arguing that
current low rates paid to court-appointed attorneys "are an insult to our professed
commitment to equal justice for all"); Appell, supra note 25, at 581-87 (observing the
marked difference in how the child welfare system treats rich and poor families and
noting that poor individuals are likely to be further disadvantaged by the burdens
placed on their appointed counsel).
167. See Buss, supra note 162, at 437; Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right
to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of
Counsel Standard, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 397, 458 (1984); Shepherd & England,
supra note 96, at 1953.
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[P]ayment formulas in several observed jurisdictions that rely on
court appointments [for indigent clients] guarantee ineffective repre-
sentation,... [because] under such a scheme, the only way an attor-
ney can break even is to do nearly nothing and do it in volume.
Naturally, it follows that "you get what you pay for." 16S
The low rates paid to court-appointed attorneys reflect the minimal
importance that the legal profession places on family law.169 By ap-
pointing poorly compensated attorneys to represent indigent parents
who are accused of neglect and faced with losing their children, the
child welfare system unfairly handicaps the respondent parent, who is
already powerless and outcast in the process. 7
In addition, the compensation differential between in-court and
out-of-court time paid to some court-appointed attorneys is similarly
inappropriate in the child protective context. Paying attorneys more
for their time spent in court sends the message that the courtroom is
the place where the most important advocacy occurs. 17 1 In neglect
proceedings, however, the time spent in court is only a small fraction
of the work that needs to be done in order to reunify families and
protect children:172 "Once a child has been adjudicated [neglected],
advocacy [in the courtroom] is replaced by mediation and negotiation
as the primary strategy for restoring children to their families."'",
In order to create and maintain a restorative environment for fami-
lies, lawyers for parents should concentrate on the unique and fragile
relationships involved. 74 Such involvement with families, however,
must be built on communication and sharing rather than in an adver-
sarial courtroom setting.' 75 Thus, by providing financial disincentives
for court-appointed attorneys to spend quality time working on cases
out-of-court, some states inappropriately discourage lawyers from ef-
fectively advocating for their clients and, as a consequence, hurt needy
families.
168. Catz & Firak, supra note 167, at 458 (footnote omitted).
169. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 107. The legal profession's treatment of fam-
ily law is particularly distressing considering that the child welfare system dispropor-
tionately affects poor families.
170. See generally Buss, supra note 162 (noting that, partly as a result of the
overburdened and cynical courts, the powerful and unrelenting child welfare agencies,
and the underpaid and under-qualified court-appointed attorneys, the child protective
system treats indigent parents with enormous disrespect).
171. See Gary Spencer, Legislators Seek Raises for Assigned Counsel, N.Y. L.,
June 7, 1990, at 1.
172. For a description of the work that needs to be done after disposition in order
to reunite families, see supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
173. Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1100.
174. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 86-88 (contending that the adversarial process
is il-suited to the child protective system where family relationships must be pre-
served and protected).
175. See id at 82-84 (noting that because relationships are at the heart of all child




IV. WHY EFFECTIVE LAWYERS FOR INDIGENT PARENTS ARE
CRITICAL ACTORS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
This part outlines a handful of problems that families in poverty
face in the child protective system and notes where effective counsel
for indigent parents could help alleviate some of these difficult
situations.
A. The Gross Inequality In The Parties' Legal Representation
Three different attorneys represent the parties-the parent, the
child, and the state-in child protective proceedings. 76 The presence
of three lawyers representing three allegedly distinct interests adds to
the adversarial nature of child protective proceedings. 177 Perhaps
even more detrimental to the process, however, is the great disparity
in legal representation among the three parties. 178 Arguing that indi-
gent parents are legally out-matched in child protective proceedings,
one commentator notes: "The most striking thing about the practice
of law in [the child protective] area is the gross inequality of represen-
tation. This is the only area of law in which the party most in need of
effective assistance of counsel is least likely to obtain it.' 79
The role of the attorney for the child welfare agency is fairly well-
settled: She must provide effective and competent legal support while
the child welfare agency that she represents works to protect children
from injury and to safeguard children's well-being.18 This includes
filing petitions against parents suspected of neglect, investigating alle-
gations of wrongdoing, meeting with caseworkers to understand a
family's particular situation, and being well-versed in the state's laws
governing child protection proceedings.' 8' Though this task is great,
176. See Areen, supra note 31, at 890.
177. See generally Weinstein, supra note 75 (discussing the shortcomings of the ad-
versarial process in the child protective context).
178. Kim Nauer explains the current disparity in New York City:
Parents who want to fight removal are outgunned. [The child welfare
agency] and the child each have institutional lawyers and support staff. Indi-
gent parents are almost always appointed "18b" attorneys. These private
practitioners, supported by a meager pool of court funds allocated under
article 18b of the New York State County Law, are underpaid and lack the
time and staff needed to deal with [the child welfare agency's] allegations.
Nauer, supra note 95, at 21-22.
179. Testimony of Martin Guggenheim Before the Assembly Standing Committee
on Children and Families Family Preservation: Preventive Services, Adoption and
Foster Care (Dec. 1, 1993) 5-6 [hereinafter Guggenheim, Testimony] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
180. Gene D. Skarin, The Role of the Child Protective Agency's Attorney in Family
Court Child Protective Proceedings, in Child Abuse, Neglect and the Foster Care Sys-
tem: 1995, at 431, 434 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
C4-4210, 1995), available in WESTLAW, 171 PLI/Crim 431.
181. See Larabee, supra note 50 (providing a step-by-step guide to effectively repre-




agency lawyers have at their disposal a wide variety of investigative
and social services assistance.182
The lawyer for the child welfare agency also shapes the substance
and form of all child protective cases that come before the court.1 3
Accordingly, the agency's lawyer exercises a great deal of power over
the other parties involved. Noting this imbalance in power, one critic
writes: "[P]arents have few rights in Family Court. Once [the child
welfare agency] has removed a child, the agency, through the courts,
wields such power that even parents with legitimate claims for the re-
turn of their children have little or no recourse in the judicial
system."'1 4
Though their role may not be as clearly defined as that of the
agency's lawyer, lawyers who represent children nevertheless enjoy
support from the legal and political world.' For example, in Febru-
ary 1996, the American Bar Association House of Delegates formally
adopted the Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Chil-
dren in Abuse and Neglect Cases ("Standards")."s The Standards at-
tempt to more clearly define the role of the law guardian, thereby
easing the jobs of lawyers for children. 187 Although -[a]mbiguity of
role and lack of clear practice standards is ... also a challenge for
attorneys who represent parents,"'" national attention has not been
similarly focused on the lawyer-parent relationship." 9 In fact, the at-
tention paid to the representation of children has noticeably ignored
the role that parents play in child protective proceedings. 190 This un-
willingness to include parents in discussions concerning the welfare of
their children inappropriately, and perhaps harmfully, ignores chil-
dren's special ties to their families.' Thus, although the interests of
the parent and the child are often aligned in neglect cases,'92 legal
182. Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 2.
183. Larabee, supra note 50, at 62.
184. Nauer, supra note 95, at 21.
185. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in the
Family Law: Of Welfare Reform, Child Support, and Relocation, 30 Fam. L.Q. 765,
774 (1997) (describing the growing concern across the nation with the quality and
quantity of legal representation for children).
186. Duquette et al., supra note 54, at 122.
187. Id at 123.
188. Id. (footnote omitted).
189. See id. ("National standards for legal representation ... of parents accused of
child maltreatment are not available currently, but their development may be very
important to improve professional practices.").
190. For example, in 1993 the American Bar Association wrote a report on the
unmet legal needs of children and their families. America's Children at Risk, supra
note 21. Although the 78-page report closely examines legal reforms to help children
and families in poverty, there is no mention of the role of parents or parents' attor-
neys in child protective proceedings. Instead, the ABA focused solely on enhancing
advocacy for children. Id at 3-8.
191. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 87-88.
192. See id. at 85 ("Ultimately, proceedings which pit children against parents ...
are antithetical to the best interests of those children.").
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scholarship and society in general have consistently refused to treat
the two parties with the same degree of concern and respect.
Both the lawyer for the child welfare agency and the law guardian
have the advantage of being recognized as important actors in the pro-
tection of children. In contrast, the dearth of legal scholarship de-
voted to the role of the lawyer for parents most likely reflects society's
unease and unwillingness to work with parents charged with ne-
glect. 93 These negative attitudes find their ways into systems of legal
representation which, in return, fail to fully assert parents' interests., 94
In theory, however, this inequality in legal representation should
not negatively affect families. All three parties are ostensibly working
toward the same fair, swift, and appropriate resolution that protects
the best interests of the child.195 Unfortunately, the agency's lawyer is
often overworked and unable to spend the appropriate amount of
time on any one case.196 In addition, she may have reservations about
cooperating with a parent whom her client has accused of neglect. 19 7
Similarly, the law guardian may be wary of the respondent parent.
Because parents and children are pitted against each other in the cur-
rent legal system,1 98 and because parents are portrayed as the enemies
in neglect proceedings,199 law guardians may feel that it is inappropri-
ate to trust respondent parents. Therefore, the lawyer for the parent
is the only representative out of the three who is willing to put faith
and energy into the outcast parent. Furthermore, the parent is the
193. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1083-84 ("Negative attitudes toward
accused parents and the behavioral manifestations of these attitudes reflect both indi-
vidual and societal biases, as well as a misreading or ignoring of the relevant child
protection laws. The intent of these laws is to help reconstitute affected families.").
194. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25, at 582 (noting that appointed counsel for indi-
gent parents "are likely to have few resources, little training, and high caseloads");
Weinstein, supra note 75, at 102-03 (noting that counsel is not universally appointed
to parents in child protection cases and, "where lawyers are appointed, they are often
underpaid, have high caseloads, and work in a system which has low expectations
about what they can do").
195. See Nauer, supra note 95, at 21 ("[Tlhe primary mission of [the child welfare
agencyl is to keep families together whenever possible. And that means supporting
the parents as well as protecting their children."); see also Catz & Firak, supra note
167, at 420 (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter and noting that "[t]he
Court recognized that since the adversary system results in fair and accurate out-
comes when both parties are represented by counsel, the state's interest are poten-
tially maximized by providing counsel to indigent parents").
196. Larabee, supra note 50, at 66 ("Working as an attorney.., for a public agency
means, among other things, that you will have a high caseload, less than palatial work-
ing conditions, and that you will never have enough time to do the kind of job on each
case that you'd like.").
197. Cf. id. at 63-64 (noting that the lawyer for the child welfare agency must learn
to recognize situations in which parents charged with abuse or neglect should not be
trusted and must be questioned and investigated thoroughly).
198. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1081-84.
199. See Buss, supra note 162, at 433-35.
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actor who is best-suited to reunite the family.2" Considering Con-
gress's recent backlash against family preservation, however, poor
parents charged with neglect are likely to begin to have an increas-
ingly difficult time achieving reunification. Thus, in order to help fam-
ilies and their children, the child protection system must begin to re-
evaluate the importance of competent and effective advocates for
parents.20 '
B. Presumptions Against The Respondent Parent In The Child
Welfare System
In neglect proceedings, which are held in a chaotic family court and
decided by an over-burdened judge,20 2 the judge's neutrality and
open-mindedness are essential to the parent's quest for expedient
reunification. In reality, though, some judges may find it difficult to
face a new case with complete objectivity.203 This difficulty most
likely stems from the frustrations of being responsible for an unman-
ageable number of cases.2 ° ' With such huge caseloads, judges may
eventually stop seeing respondent parents as individuals. 205 In this
overburdened system, then, an effective lawyer for the parent is essen-
tial to making her client's circumstances fully known to and under-
stood by the court.20 6
In addition to facing an overwhelming docket each day, judges are
held accountable to the public for their sometimes difficult rulings in
child protective cases." 7 As a result of this public scrutiny, some
200. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing the importance of parents' involvement
throughout child neglect proceedings).
201. See Shepherd & England, supra note 96, at 1953 ("Competent professional
representation in proceedings that involve children is vital in a system where decisions
about children's rights and liberties and those of their parents are decided.").
202. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1092 (noting family court judges' -se-
verely overcrowded dockets").
203. Annette Appell finds that some judges harbor negative attitudes toward indi-
gent parents. She attributes this problem in part to the racial and class disparities
between the judges and the respondents: "In contrast to the largely poor and dispro-
portionately African American families [involved in the] child protection [system[,
the judges ... are mostly middle-class and white." Appell, supra note 25, at 585. As a
result, some judges who "monitor these families see them as pathological, incompe-
tent, and less worthy of preservation." Id.
204. For example, "[j]udges hearing child protection matters in Chicago carry up to
3000 cases." Id. at 602 n.116.
205. Dohrn, supra note 98, at 5.
206. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 102 (stating that where the system appears to
be the parent's "enemy," the parent's attorney may be the only trusted voice who can
help the parent). Individual advocacy is arguably more important now than it ever
had been in the past in light of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. By
changing the general philosophy in the child welfare system from one of family pres-
ervation to one of child protection, courts today may be even less inclined to recog-
nize sympathetic family circumstances.
207. See Boyer, supra note 78, at 1621-24. For example, in the controversial and
highly publicized case of the child abuse murder of seven year old Elisa Izquierdo, the
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judges may be reluctant to return children to allegedly neglectful par-
ents. 0 8 Watchful of the media, some judges may "rubber-stamp" the
child welfare agency's determination in place of making more impar-
tial decisions.20 9 For example, to the detriment of families, some ar-
gue that "judges have tended to either ignore [the reasonable efforts]
requirement or to make unwarranted findings that 'reasonable efforts'
had been made. '210 In fact, although the child welfare agency is le-
gally mandated to make reasonable efforts to keep most families to-
gether,21' in practice the presumption is actually against the family
unit and in favor of removal. 2  Without adequate legal representa-
tion throughout the proceedings, indigent parents will continue to be
victims of the current system.21
3
media frequently mentioned the name of the judge who sent the child home to her
mother. See David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate, Time, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32, 35
(discussing the role of the family court judge involved in the case). Elisa's mother
admitted to killing her child by throwing her against a concrete wall. Id. at 33. She
also confessed that she had made Elisa eat her own feces and that she had mopped
the floor with the child's head. Id. Hounded by the press after this tragic death, the
judge who awarded custody of Elisa to her mother stated: "It is any judge's worst
nightmare to be involved in a case in which a child dies." Id. at 35.
208. Nauer, supra note 95, at 21. Nauer writes:
[N]o one-including the judges-wants to be blamed later for putting a child
back into an abusive or neglectful home. This position is so pervasive that
[child welfare agency] lawyers used it to brace their legal arguments in the
case. They called it the "safer course doctrine." No such doctrine exists in
legal precedent; it would be antithetical to the due process protections in
Family Court law.
Id. at 22; see also Weinstein, supra note 75, at 113 ("[Jludges are likely to skew their
decision-making based on the fear of harming a child by placing him with parents who
could hurt him."); Restoring the Community Connection, Child Welfare Watch, Winter
1997, at 1, 5 (observing that the recent increase in improper removals by the state
reflects a misguided yet widespread attitude of "better safe than sorry").
209. Nauer, supra note 95, at 21 ("[Judges] have become arbiters for the child wel-
fare system.., unwilling to come down on the parents' side in a decision, even when
the evidence is in their favor.").
210. Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 468.
211. Though the supporters of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 criti-
cized the reasonable efforts requirement, this requirement nevertheless remains a part
of federal law. The ASF did, however, explain the requirement further: "[In deter-
mining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child ... the child's health and
safety shall be the paramount concern." Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a)(A), 111 Stat.
2115, 2116.
212. Guggenheim, Testimony, supra note 179, at 4. Professor Guggenheim notes
that, in the current child protective system, which is pitted against parents, the ques-
tion that is asked in practice is: "How will I fare if we don't remove the child and
there is trouble in the future?" Id.
213. Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1093 ("[B]ut for the intervention of [effec-
tive parents' lawyers], the widespread violation of parents' and children's rights by
judges would continue unchecked.").
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C. Overreaching State Intervention Too Often Acts To The
Family's Detriment
Critics of state intervention into families' lives argue that child wel-
fare agencies disproportionately target families in poverty.-2 1 4 Many
argue that "[p]oor families are more susceptible to state intervention
because they lack power and resources and because they are more
directly involved with governmental agencies. ' 21- In addition, some
critics charge that the scrutiny and state involvement in poor people's
lives are not the only reasons why families accused of neglect are dis-
proportionately poor.216 Specifically, institutional biases against par-
ents in poverty can influence state intervention. 21 '7 By ignoring the
larger conditions of poverty in which families live and blaming parents
for their families' misfortunes,218 the state sometimes intervenes in
poor families' lives with the idea of "fixing" their situations."' In-
stead of assisting parents to rebuild their lives and their relationships
with their children, state intervention of this sort can unfortunately
fail to directly address the root causes of the families' difficulties. 220
Thus, the more crucial issue surrounding state intervention should
be whether the state's intervention serves to better the family as a
whole.2' Although the state may intervene with good intentions of
protecting children and helping families, the danger certainly exists
214. Annette Appell remarks that, historically, there are two systems of family law-
"The private system adjudicates custody among relatively wealthy parents... [and]
the public system adjudicates custody among the state and predominately poor
mothers in child protection courts." Appell, supra note 25, at 581. She continues: "A
key difference between the private and public systems ... is that the former is more
deferential to parental rights and family autonomy, whereas the latter is more tolerant
of... state usurpation of custody." Id.
215. Id. at 584; see also America's Children at Risk, supra note 21, at 51
("[Flamilies of color, and poor families, are more likely to be identified and coerced
into accepting interventions by the child welfare system.").
216. See Pelton, supra note 80, at 23 (arguing that poor families are in fact dispro-
portionately involved in issues of child neglect not because the state intervenes more
frequently, but because the real problems underlying neglect are closely tied to the
problems of living in poverty). For a further discussion of the connection between
poverty and neglect, see supra part IL
217. See Appell, supra note 25, at 587-89 (stating that states may target mothers
based on a number of factors, including race).
218. See Dohrn, supra note 98, at 2.
219. Appell, supra note 25, at 587.
220. See, eg., id. at 589-600 (telling the stories of three families in need and how the
state's intervention in all three cases failed to address, and in fact worsened, the real
issues the families faced).
221. See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 463.
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222that families will be hurt in the process. 2 In fact, sometimes state
intervention does act to a family's detriment: 2
23
[T]here is substantial evidence to suggest that, except in cases in-
volving very seriously harmed children, a child's situation is rarely
improved through coercive state intervention. This is particularly
true when, as is most frequently the case, intervention takes the
form of removal from the parental home, often placing a child in a
more detrimental environment. 224
Whether the state intervenes by removing a child from her parent's
home or whether the state seeks to provide a family with services,
once a state has intervened in a family's life it is responsible for ensur-
ing that the family's quality of life improves. 225 The parent's lawyer,
then, plays the crucial and much needed role of ensuring that the state
agency does not infringe upon powerless families but, rather, fulfills its
obligations to help them.
1. Removing Children From Their Families
State child welfare agencies have been heavily criticized for inter-
vening too often, 226 too soon, 2 27 and without procedural safeguards 22
in poor families' lives. Such practices can lead to "needless or unwar-
ranted separation of children from their families [and] can have severe
consequences for [the entire family]. 229 Many experts in the child
protective field are well aware of the psychological harm to children
222. See Donald N. Duquette, Liberty and Lawyers in Child Protection, in The Bat-
tered Child 316, 317 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Heifer eds., 3d ed. 1980). This
danger mounts when confounded with the fact that families in the child welfare sys-
tem are often poor and powerless. Id. at 318. Thus, the connection between poverty
and state intervention not only affects the number of poor families in whose lives a
state intervenes, but also influences the quality of the state intervention.
223. See, e.g., English & Tritz, supra note 98, at 187 (noting that between 35% and
70% of children whom the state places in foster care "should not be there and can be
severely damaged by the experience").
224. Kindred, supra note 24, at 529-30 (footnotes omitted).
225. English & Tritz, supra note 98, at 189.
226. For example, in New York City, the number of children removed from their
families by child welfare officials increased twenty five percent between 1996 and
1997. Restoring the Community Connection, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 1.
227. The introduction to the second issue of Child Welfare Watch, an issue devoted
to exploring community-based child welfare services, reads:
There is no question that the most serious cases of abuse and neglect warrant
immediate removal of the children. Yet in the sweeping majority of cases,
either a more thorough investigation is necessary before allegations can be
proven or the allegation itself points to the need for preventive intervention,
not removal. In such cases, government should avoid burdening the children
and their families with the horrendous trauma of separation.
Sadly this is not the way the system currently functions.
Id.
228. See Nauer, supra note 95, at 21 ("[Child welfare agency] workers routinely use
their emergency removal powers to take children from their parents before getting a
court order approving the action.").
229. Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 1.
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when they are separated from their parents and placed into foster
care." ° In the majority of child protective cases that deal with paren-
tal neglect, the risk of psychological harm may be much greater than
the risk of allowing the child to remain a part of her family unit:23
Of all the substantiated cases of abuse and neglect addressed by
[New York City's child welfare agency], fewer than 10 percent in-
volve any kind of physical or severe emotional abuse. The remain-
ing 90 percent involve charges of neglect against parents who have
allegedly failed to care properly for their children. Most child wel-
fare experts understand that it is emotionally far less traumatic for
the child-and far more cost effective for the taxpayer-to help
most such parents become better caretakers rather than to keep
their children for years in foster care. 232
In spite of the abundant knowledge about children's development and
the harm that removals impose on children, states nevertheless con-
tinue to respond to charges of neglect in this most intrusive and harsh
manner.
233
The question logically becomes, then: "[W]hat, exactly, is the best
way of [ensuring the safety and well-being of children]? By promptly
removing children from allegedly neglectful parents and putting them
in foster care, or by helping parents learn to stop being neglectful?" ' 3-
This question is particularly compelling in neglect cases where the
state breaks up families in which the parent is not guilty of any wrong-
doing. 3 Recognizing this important issue, some child welfare experts
have concluded that "removal of neglected children from parental
custody to foster care can no longer be the state's primary response to
poverty-induced child neglect." 6 Thus, child welfare experts are in-
230. See Guggenheim, Testimony, supra note 179, at 5 (noting that the state too
often removes children from their families without first providing services to the fam-
ily and, as a result, children are "far more seriously harmed by those removals--
whether physically or psychologically-than if state officials never heard of them in
the first place").
231. See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 451 (stating that protecting family
relations is essential to a child's physical and emotional development).
232. Myths and Facts: The Big Picture, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 7.
233. The illegitimacy of some of these removals has been judicially recognized: -Of
late, Family Court judges have reported that, in an increasing number of cases
brought before them, the child's removal was not justified." Restoring the Community
Connection, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 1, 5.
234. Does Child Welfare Devalue the Fainily?, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at
2.
235. See generally Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22 (criticizing state interven-
tion when the child welfare agency removes children from their homes only because
the family is in poverty). Some critics note the incidents where children are removed
from their parents through no measurable fault of the parent: For example, parents
have been charged with abuse or neglect for too frequently allowing their children to
eat breakfast at McDonald's, for not allowing their children to watch television after
7:30 p.m., and for being late to pick up children after school. Richard Wexler,
Wounded Innocents: The Real Victims of the War Against Child Abuse 17 (1990).
236. Kindred, supra note 24, at 538.
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creasingly aware that, in cases of neglect, families can be best helped
with proper attention and preventive services.237
2. Providing Services to Families in Need
Preventive services are an alternate way that states may intervene
to remove problems from needy homes without separating children
from their families.3 8 Service plans often attempt to aid families in
many areas, including "child welfare, education, health, housing,
mental health, substance abuse, and criminal justice."" 9 Because
many child welfare experts feel that "state intervention should be
based on protecting and strengthening the parent-child relationship,
rather than intervening despite the relationship, 24 ° states are highly
encouraged to provide such services to families before intervening in
any other manner.241 In fact, some argue that states have an affirma-
tive obligation to provide assistance to poor families before interven-
ing to remove children from their parents.242
Nevertheless, state agencies are continually criticized for failing to
refer at-risk families to preventive services.243 Critics question
whether states are actually committed to making preventive services
237. Families Get Lost in ACS Plan, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 6.
238. English & TritZ, supra note 98, at 188.
239. Beyer, supra note 98, at 311. Many child welfare experts, however, criticize
the adequacy of the services that child welfare agencies provide to families. See, e.g.,
Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 453 ("[T]he inadequacy of supportive services
in the community... means that many children are removed due to the lack of other
more appropriate options." (quoting Proposals Related to Social and Child Welfare
Services, Adoption Assistance, and Foster Care, 1979: Hearing on H.R. 3434 Before
the Subcomm. on Pub. Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
260 (1979) (testimony submitted by the Association for the Children of New Jersey))).
240. Appell, supra note 25, at 610.
241. For example, The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 "made
federal reimbursement of state expenditures for foster care contingent upon states
first attempting to prevent foster care placements when possible." Meryl Schwartz,
Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare,
22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 441,449 (1996). Of course, one very important way
to prevent foster care placements is to provide the family with preventive services. See
The Assault on Preventive Services, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 4 ("Preven-
tive services have long been a successful, core element of the child welfare system,
providing thousands of needy families with access to social services at a time when
they would otherwise be threatened with collapse."). With the Adoption and Safe
Families Act's new interpretation of the reasonable efforts requirement, however, it is
not currently known how much of an emphasis the child welfare system will place on
preventive services in the future. Even worse, the harm this may cause to families is
compounded by many agency caseworkers' known dislike for parents charged with
neglect. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 26, at 203-04 (noting caseworkers' biases against
biological parents).
242. Kindred, supra note 24, at 536.
243. For example, in New York City, there was a dramatic forty percent decline in
the number of children referred by the city to preventive services between 1992 and
1997. The Assault on Preventive Services, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 4.
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available to families at all.2 " For example, although problems with
neglect are increasing throughout the country,245 states do not always
adequately increase spending on preventive services in order to fill the
rising need.246 In fact, some agencies are cutting funding and referrals
for preventive services while the need for such key services esca-
lates.247 Through such actions, child welfare agencies disserve poor
families by choosing intrusive and paternalistic forms of interven-
tion, 4' thereby greatly reducing the likelihood that poor families will
be helped in the long-run.
Finally, when child welfare agencies do provide preventive services
to needy families, the chosen services too often fail to address the
problems that families in poverty actually encounter. 249 Rather than
taking the time to tailor a program that is unique and specific to the
family's needs,"0 "families often receive 'boilerplate' service plans
which can add to, rather than alleviate the families' problems." - 1 Un-
fortunately, the bureaucracy that plagues child welfare agencies can
tie caseworkers' hands and prevent well-meaning child welfare offi-
cials from adequately serving poor families: - 2
244. See Appell, supra note 25, at 600 ("More than a decade after the federal gov-
eminent enacted funding legislation designed to protect against the over reliance and
abuses of foster care, the states are still failing to provide the meaningful supports that
would allow families to remain intact.").
245. See National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, In Fact
... : Answers to Frequently Asked Questions on Child Abuse and Neglect (visited
Mar. 9, 1998) <http'//ww.calib.com/nccanchlpubsinfact.htm> (recording a substan-
tial increase in the number of instances of abuse or neglect in the country: From 1986
to 1993, there was a 67% increase in child abuse and neglect charges; this 1993 figure
reflects a 149% increase in abuse and neglect charges from 1980, the time that Con-
gress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act).
246. See The Geography of Prevention, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 4
("From fiscal year 1996 to 1997, abuse and neglect reports in New York City shot up
seven percent, from 48,702 to 52,106. But for fiscal year 1998, the city has increased
preventive spending by only one percent, from $126 million to S127.5 million.").
247. See Families Get Lost in ACS Plan, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 6
(noting that the child welfare agency in New York City has made "'painful cuts" in
funding and referrals to preventive services).
248. Critics argue that the declining numbers of referrals to preventive services "re-
flects the defensive mentality of protective caseworkers following a year of bad
press-i.e., it's better to remove children first and ask questions later." The Assault on
Preventive Services, Child Welfare Watch, Spring 1997, at 4.
249. See Appell, supra note 25, at 596.
250. See Beyer, supra note 98, at 324.
251. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 120; see also Appell, supra note 25, at 601 ("In-
stead of offering meaningful assistance, caseworkers too often take a cookie cutter
approach to the families and their problems."); Beyer, supra note 98, at 314 (-Many
states do not consistently adhere to the spirit of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act. Rather, they define reasonable efforts in terms of those services already
available, however inadequate, and plug families into limited, predefined services.").
252. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1088 (quoting a doctor who noted that




[C]aseworkers cannot keep up .... The heavy demand [on child
welfare agencies] in fact hinders the provision of services to protect
and support families .... The problems become interchangeable, the
serious ones indistinguishable from the minor ones; and needs are
generalized and defined according to what services are currently
available.
253
Because underfunded, understaffed, and mismanaged child welfare
agencies are responsible for handling and evaluating families'
problems,2 54 these agencies cannot meet their mandates255 and fami-
lies suffer in the process. Although states must make "reasonable ef-
forts" to keep families together, in practice child welfare agencies
make "efforts [that] are reasonable in relation to funding available,
but not in relation to [caseworkers'] knowledge of effective program-
ming.,256 Thus, the reasonable efforts requirement, originally created
to protect families, does not achieve its purpose in practice. Further-
more, the clarification of this requirement provided by the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 199757 is not likely to encourage agencies to
make greater efforts to help families. Accordingly, indigent parents
are in great need of trained, competent, and able advocates to help
them obtain the services they require.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR How STATES AND THE LAWYERS WHO
WORK WITHIN THE STATES CAN ENSURE THAT
INDIGENT PARENTS ARE BEST REPRESENTED IN
NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
This final part argues that, for the well-being of the children and the
entire family, parents in poverty accused of neglect deserve and re-
quire competent and effective counsel throughout their involvement
in the child welfare system. Accordingly, this part advocates that all
states should provide indigent parents with a statutory right to counsel
in neglect cases and describes some important components of this stat-
253. Appell, supra note 25, at 601 (footnotes omitted).
254. Nauer, supra note 95, at 22.
255. Appell, supra note 25, at 600 ("It is no secret that local child protection agen-
cies are not meeting their mandates .... In fact, nearly half of the states are under
court supervision for failing to provide basic services to children in need of protec-
tion." (footnotes omitted)).
256. Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 22, at 454 (quoting Foster Care, Child Wel-
fare, and Adoption Reforms, 1988: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Pub.
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House of Representatives
Comm. on Ways and Means and the Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1988) (testimony of Select Comm. Chr. Hon. George
Miller)). In his congressional testimony, the Director of a Minnesota Department of
Community Services stated: "[I]n fact, services are not really available.... we are just
shuffling kids around hoping that they don't die in the process, because that is the
worst thing that can happen to you in terms of public relations." Id. at 456 (footnote
omitted).
257. Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116.
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utory right. Furthermore, to ensure that indigent parents receive
knowledgeable legal representation, this part proposes that states es-
tablish certification programs for their court-appointed attorneys. Fi-
nally, this part suggests some ways in which parents' lawyers can act to
best help families during their time in the child welfare system.
A. States Must Recognize A Meaningfid Right To Counsel For
Indigent Parents In Neglect Proceedings
By passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, the federal
government has announced its firm commitment to fighting for the
health and happiness of all children. In addition to protecting chil-
dren from abusive homes, 258 this commitment also requires helping
needy families stay together whenever possible and appropriate. 259
This Note argues that, perhaps today more than ever before, the law-
yer for the indigent parent has a crucial role to play in helping needy
families remain intact and in protecting children from coercive state
intervention and damaging removal from their parents. In order for
parents' lawyers to make a difference in the lives of the poor families
who enter the child welfare system, however, states must do their
parts by providing indigent parents with a meaningful statutory right
to counsel in neglect proceedings. 26°
Without a skilled attorney advocating to reunite the family, poor
parents in the child welfare system are often left powerless and hope-
less.26 When the state coercively intervenes in a poor family's life,
separates children from their parents, and demands certain actions
from the parents before it will consider returning the children, parents
are understandably confused, heartbroken, and terrified. Further, this
rush of emotions that comes when the state removes one's children is
heightened when the family at issue is poor.262 Without economic re-
sources, a network of knowledgeable contacts, or much education,
parents in poverty who lack legal representation are unfairly and inex-
cusably at the mercy of the very agency that took their children from
them.263 The harm of not having legal representation is even more
258. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (noting that the main focus of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 is to protect children from abuse).
259. Senator DeWine of Ohio, one of the members of Congress who proposed the
Adoption and Safe Families Act, recognized the importance of preserving families:
"We should not be in the position of taking children away just because the parents are
too poor-or just because there is a problem in the family. If the problem can be
fixed, we must try to keep the family together for the children's benefit." 142 Cong.
Rec. 85712 (daily ed. June 4, 1996).
260. Many states already provide indigent parents with a statutory right to counsel.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text. This section, however, argues that all
states should provide these rights and, further, that these rights must be meaningful
for parents in poverty.
261. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part IV.A.
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egregious in light of the anti-parent bias that pervades the child wel-
fare system.26 Thus, if indigent parents do not have legal representa-
tion, no one in the system will likely voice concern for the parents'
rights.265
As a necessary check on the potentially devastating actions of child
welfare agencies, out of a basic sense of fairness to the families in-
volved in neglect proceedings, and out of an appreciation for poor
families' circumstances that are often the main cause of the neglect
charge, all states should recognize a right to counsel for indigent par-
ents in neglect proceedings. In accord with the goals of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997,266 lawyers for indigent parents can play
a crucial role in helping the state child welfare agencies determine
those families who should be reunited and, thus, who deserve appro-
priate and intensive services. Thus, it is in both the family's and the
state's best interests to provide indigent parents with adequate and
effective court-appointed counsel in neglect proceedings.
Simply recognizing a right to counsel for indigent parents, however,
may not be enough to help families in poverty. To ensure that poor
families are best protected when they are involved with the child pro-
tective system, states' assigned counsel statutes must be sensitive to
the important role that parents' lawyers play in the lives of families in
poverty. Thus, these statutes must provide parents' lawyers with the
opportunities to best serve their clients.
First, states need to provide indigent parents with their assigned
counsel in advance of their first court date.267 Meeting their attorneys
ahead of their first appearances in court will allow indigent parents to
alleviate some of the problems they would otherwise encounter in the
child welfare system by: (1) telling their stories to their attorneys,
thereby feeling a sense of control over their situations; 68 (2) helping
264. See supra Part IV.B.
265. Martin Guggenheim further notes that even if the child welfare agencies act
with the best intentions of the parents in mind, the outcomes are nevertheless not
always positive for the families:
Good intentions on the part of the state authorities and agencies involved in
child protection proceedings are no guarantee that they will have prophetic
powers or even good judgment. As Justice Brandeis observed in his dissent-
ing opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928): "Experi-
ence should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."
Martin Guggenheim, Ethical Considerations in Child Welfare Cases: Duties of the
Law Guardian and the Parent's Attorney, in Child Abuse, Neglect and the Foster Care
System 1998, at 657, 662 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
C-179, 1998).
266. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part III.C.2.
268. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing the importance of empowering poor parents
by demanding that they take active roles in their cases).
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to prepare their attorneys to appear in court, thereby reducing the
power that the agency has over poor families; and (3) increasing the
speed with which they can begin to fight to keep or to be reunited
with their children.
Second, states must continue to provide indigent parents with court-
appointed counsel after the dispositional hearing.2 9 Because neglect
proceedings are shaped by parents' future behavior and not by their
past conduct, parents' lawyers must be available after the trial has
ended to monitor families' progress and to assist families in rebuilding
their lives. By failing to provide parents with lawyers who understand
the child protective system and who can advocate on parents' behalf
after disposition, states will wrongly continue to process dis-
empowered and uninvolved indigent parents through an over-worked
system that fails to take their individual circumstances into account.270
Instead, if states redefine the scope of parents' lawyers' representation
to include their active involvement after disposition, then states will
help ensure that the agencies make reasonable and appropriate de-
mands on parents, that parents actually obtain necessary services and
become involved in their own cases, and that families in poverty are
reunited sooner. Thus, by providing indigent parents with court-ap-
pointed counsel after disposition, states will best comply with Con-
gress's goal of quicker permanency for children.
Finally, state assigned counsel programs must make a commitment
to compensate parents' attorneys appropriately and fairly for the
meaningful services they provide.271 For example, by abolishing the
differential between rates paid for in-court and out-of-court time,
states will send the important message that child protective cases are
best resolved through negotiation, collaboration, and compliance with
individually-tailored service plans rather than through the adversarial
courtroom process. When attorneys are encouraged to work dili-
gently for their clients out of court, child protective proceedings will
be resolved more smoothly and quickly, thereby best serving the fam-
ily involved. Failing to sufficiently compensate parents' lawyers dis-
courages complete representation, active involvement, and genuine
devotion to poor families. Furthermore, on a larger scale, paying par-
ents' lawyers insultingly low wages is an affront to the legal profes-
sion's stated commitment to equal justice for all. Thus, in order to
help their most needy, most disadvantaged, and most fragile citizens,
states must make a firm commitment to provide poor families in the
child welfare system with well-trained, well-prepared, and well-com-
pensated court-appointed counsel.
269. See supra Part III.C.3.
270. See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.C.4.
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B. States Must Certify And Train Lawyers For This Type Of
Representation To Ensure That Indigent Parents Are
Provided With A Meaningful Right To Counsel
This part argues for the proper training of parents' lawyers and pro-
poses a model certification program that states should require all at-
torneys to complete before representing families in poverty in the
child welfare system.
1. The Importance Of Interdisciplinary Training For Attorneys
Who Work In The Child Protective System
Given the numerous problems that plague the child welfare system
and, more specifically, the particular difficulties that indigent parents
face in this system, lawyers for parents have an admittedly difficult
role to play. In order to best and most effectively represent families'
interests, it is essential that lawyers approach their cases with an inter-
disciplinary understanding of the issues involved:
The knowledge required by ... professionals [in the field of child
neglect] covers a broad spectrum. It includes human behavior, in-
tervention methods, family dynamics, child development, substance
abuse and mental health issues, an understanding of the legal re-
quirements for intervention and the process by which legal decisions
are made, and effective collaboration skills.272
Because child welfare law involves many non-traditional legal is-
sues,2 7 3 a proper appreciation of other disciplines is key to ensuring
that lawyers for indigent parents fully understand the scope and depth
of their clients' problems. In order to gain such an appreciation and
understanding, lawyers for indigent parents require specialized
t
2 7 4training.27
The Federal Government has recognized this need for formal,
multi-disciplinary training for lawyers who practice in the child protec-
tive area. In 1988, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
awarded grants for interdisciplinary training in academic institutions
to prepare graduate students to work in the child welfare system. 2 75
Through the generosity of these grants, institutions around the coun-
try have created interdisciplinary seminars in the area of child abuse
272. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 157-58 (footnotes omitted).
273. Criticizing the use of the traditional legal adversarial model in child protection
cases, Janet Weinstein observes: Child welfare law "is not a field which is 'owned' by
the law. Social work and mental health professionals play substantial roles in both
juvenile and family courts. Nevertheless, the legal process seems to be running the
show-a case of the tail wagging the dog." Id. at 84 (footnote omitted).
274. Isaacs, supra note 147, at 238; see also Weinstein, supra note 75, at 104 ("All
professionals involved [in the child welfare system] suffer from this training deficit.
Judges, attorneys, social workers, physicians, mental health experts and other child
advocates are inadequately trained about the many issues which affect this type of
work.").
275. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 157.
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and neglect. 276 These seminars typically focus on the connections be-
tween law, social work, and psychology in the child protective area.m7
Such academic programs greatly serve the child welfare system as a
whole by ensuring that entering professionals have a genuine under-
standing of the complexities of the field.278
Short of this multifaceted training at the graduate school level, law-
yers who represent indigent parents in neglect proceedings must be
properly trained after entering this area of the law:
Because of the complexity of families' needs and the complexity of
the service delivery system itself, quality training and professional
education for all professions involved in child welfare must be inter-
disciplinary. Child-oriented and family-oriented reform necessitates
that front-line service providers and legal counsel continuously up-
grade their knowledge and skills in such fields as child development,
family law, cultural competence, and child welfare history. Quality
professional training and education can occur.., in continuing pro-
fessional education programs.
279
With a proper understanding of their clients' circumstances and an
appreciation for the job that child welfare agency caseworkers must
do, lawyers for indigent parents will likely be more successful at re-
uniting families. Furthermore, in light of the current changes in na-
tional child welfare policy away from family preservation, a lawyer
who understands the system thoroughly and can "speak the language"
of the other professionals involved in her client's life will be a great
asset to a family in poverty which, without the help of an effective
advocate, otherwise faces the tragic possibility of being separated
permanently.
2. The Certification Procedure That States Should Adopt 2
s
'
Given the importance of interdisciplinary training in child protec-
tive cases, states that provide indigent parents with court-appointed
276. See Suellyn Scarnecchia, An Interdisciplinar' Seminar in Chihl Abuse and Ne-
glect with a Focus on Child Protection Practice, 31 U. Mich. J.L Reform 33 (1997)
(describing the topics covered in the University of Michigan's interdisciplinary semi-
nar in child abuse and neglect and explaining the importance of such an interdiscipli-
nary approach to working in the child welfare field). The University of Oklahoma
also took advantage of this federal grant and created a program at its Health Science
Center which trains future lawyers, physicians, psychologists, and social workers to
understand each others' disciplines. Professionals Given Abuse Training, Daily
Oklahoman, Nov. 12, 1990, available in 1990 WL 3040128.
277. Scarnecchia, supra note 276, at 35.
278. See id (noting the need for this interdisciplinary training early in a profes-
sional's education).
279. Duquette et al., supra note 54, at 106.
280. In states that already provide indigent parents with a statutory right to
counsel, the administrative offices that oversee the compensation for their assigned
counsel programs should also be responsible for supervising and conducting this
certification program. By tying an attorney's initial training and her continuing
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counsel must devise a system to ensure that the lawyers are properly
trained to advocate for these parents. Thus, this section suggests some
components of a certification program for parents' lawyers that would
help provide indigent parents with a meaningful right to counsel in
neglect proceedings.
In order to be certified to represent indigent parents in neglect pro-
ceedings, attorneys should complete an intensive, week-long training
program. States should divide this training into two components:
Classroom training and courtroom training.
a. Classroom Training
During the classroom portion of the training program, states must
familiarize lawyers with the different professionals who will be in-
volved in their clients' lives. For example, states should have social
workers, psychologists, agency caseworkers, and substance abuse spe-
cialists come into the classroom to educate lawyers about their roles in
the lives of families in the child welfare system. In addition to learn-
ing about the unique roles that other professionals play, this portion
of the training should highlight the connections between all of the ac-
tors involved in poor families' lives and their common interests in
helping needy families. The goal of this interdisciplinary training is to
foster communication and understanding among the different profes-
sions. Thus, once trained attorneys are in practice, it is hoped that
these lawyers will de-emphasize the adversarial nature of child protec-
tive proceedings, which often works to the detriment of the families
entrusted to their care.
Furthermore, the classroom training should include a discussion of
the various service programs that the state offers to families in the
child welfare system. Although the child welfare agency, and not par-
ents' lawyers, is responsible for providing families with appropriate
services, parents' lawyers should nevertheless have an understanding
of the state's different offerings. Because parents' lawyers are much
better-situated to become familiar with a family's particular needs and
circumstances than the overburdened child welfare agency, being in-
formed about the types of programs available to families and the vari-
ous problems that such programs hope to target will help parents'
lawyers best advocate for carefully-tailored service plans for families.
Thus, states should invite child welfare caseworkers to educate law-
yers about the services that their agencies offer. Further, this portion
of the training should also include a discussion with actual parents
who have gone through some of the various programs. This firsthand
information about the efficacy of the service programs will help par-




ents' lawyers understand which programs will most suitably assist their
clients.
Finally, states' training programs must educate lawyers about the
child welfare system in general. Because the system is so complex and
different from anything that most lawyers have encountered before
and because it will become such an integral part of parents' lawyers
practice, states must prepare these attorneys before they enter the sys-
tem. Thus, this portion of the training should highlight the unique
aspects of the child protective system, including the focus toward pro-
tection and rehabilitation and away from blame and punishment, 21
the almost exclusively poor population in the child welfare system and
the problems that families in poverty typically encounter,1 2 the biases
and stereotypes that unfortunately pervade the entire child protective
system,2 3 the very real harm that state intervention and removals can
cause to children and their families,2' and the difficulties of working
within a large government bureaucracy." 5 Only once parents' lawyers
feel comfortable and familiar with the challenging child welfare sys-
tem can they effectively work within the system to help needy families
rebuild their lives.
b. Courtroom Training
Before states certify lawyers to represent indigent parents, they also
must train these attorneys to litigate in court. Parents' lawyers will
need to be extremely well-versed in the procedures and substantive
laws of the family courts where they will practice. Thus, this portion
of the training should include an in-depth review of the applicable
state child protective law. States should invite lawyers and judges
from their family courts to educate the lawyers who are being trained.
In addition to a review of the law, states must acquaint lawyers with
the courts themselves. Thus, the final portion of the certification pro-
cess should require lawyers to observe child protection cases.' By
watching actual trials at the end of their training, lawyers will have the
unique opportunity to see what they have learned being implemented
in practice. Parents' lawyers will be able to most effectively serve
their clients only after gaining an appreciation for the other profes-
sions involved in the child welfare system, learning about the com-
plexities of the system, becoming familiar with the procedural and
281. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part II.
283. See supra Part IV.B.
284. See supra Part 1V.C.
285. See supra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
286. If a state does not allow visitors into its family courtrooms, then this final part
of the training should require lawyers to participate in trial simulations. Using the
same lawyers and judges who lectured about the procedural and substantive laws in
the courts, states should establish a mock trial program to familiarize lawyers with the
nature of child protective proceedings.
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substantive laws applied in family court, and observing actual court
proceedings. Accordingly, states should require all such training
before certifying lawyers to represent indigent parents and compen-
sating them for such service.
C. How Lawyers In The Child Protective System Can Best
Implement Indigent Parents' Right To Counsel
Once lawyers are appropriately trained and certified to represent
parents in poverty, they must use their knowledge and skills in a man-
ner that most effectively advocates for indigent families.
1. Lawyers For Indigent Parents Must Work Collaboratively With
The Child Welfare Agency
One of the most important ways that a lawyer can use her interdis-
ciplinary training is to form a collaborative team of professionals
which, together, will assist families in need. 87 Promoting the benefits
that a highly skilled team would bring to families, one child welfare
expert warns: "[I]n the absence of a team of lawyers working together
with a team of other professionals, including social workers, mental
health professionals, homemakers, and counselors, among others, the
task of successfully representing parents in these cases is exceedingly
difficult and frequently is doomed to failure." '88 Such an approach
would particularly assist families in poverty who are not only over-
represented in the child welfare system, but who also suffer from
problems on multiple levels. Although the law traditionally compart-
mentalizes people's lives, focusing narrowly on only one issue at a
time, in reality people experience a host of different issues simultane-
ously. Thus, lawyers who use their training in the child protective area
to work together with other professionals in the field will be much
more successful at helping the whole family.
This collaboration among professionals could also serve to lessen
the power that the child welfare agencies currently exercise over fami-
lies in poverty. 89 Cooperation between the lawyer for the indigent
parent and the child welfare caseworker, for example, could ease
some of the negative sentiments against parents that currently per-
vade the child protective system. 290 This increased appreciation
among child welfare workers for the problems that families in poverty
287. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 141 (advocating for a change in child protec-
tive proceedings from the adversarial model to one that focuses on collaborative
problem solving).
288. Guggenheim, Testimony, supra note 179, at 7.
289. See Granik, supra note 116, at 3-4 (recognizing the power that the child wel-
fare agency has over the future of families in the system and suggesting that lawyers
for parents seek productive, non-confrontational relationships with the agencies).
290. See Hamburg, supra note 63 (explaining the prevalent "parent-bashing cul-
ture" in the child welfare agencies and noting the harm that such negative attitudes
causes children and their families).
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face and, more importantly, for the capabilities and promise that fami-
lies truly have, is especially important now that the national policy on
child welfare cases is quickly moving away from one of family
preservation.
When working with the agency, lawyers for parents should focus
primarily on the family's service plan. Because caseworkers are often
too overburdened to carefully tailor services plans to each family's
specific needs,29 parents need someone to make the family's unique
circumstances known to the child welfare agency. By maintaining a
close and interested relationship with the family throughout the child
protective process, the parent's lawyer is well-positioned to work with
the agency to create an appropriate service plan. -9 -
Finally, while collaborating with the agency, the parent's lawyer
must work toward increasing the visitation between children in foster
care and their parents: 293 Frequently visiting their children in foster
care is one of the most important steps that parents can take toward
successful reunification. 294 As such, by advocating vigorously to in-
crease the frequency of parent-child contact, the parent's lawyer can
significantly speed up the reunification process. 2-' As a result, faster
resolutions of neglect cases will not only benefit families, but will also
comply with Congress's goal of more quickly achieving permanency
for children.
2. Lawyers for Indigent Parents Must Actively Involve Families in
Their Own Cases
Even the most outstanding preventive services, the best trained and
most highly compensated counsel, the most well-managed and cooper-
ative child welfare agency, and the ideal child protective system free
of biases and bureaucratic difficulties cannot solve families' problems
291. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (describing the -boilerplate"
service plans that the overworked child welfare agencies often dole out to families).
292. Martin Guggenheim writes:
The case plan is supposed to be tailored specifically to the needs of the fam-
ily. Effective intervention by a lawyer may prove instrumental in ensuring
that the family receives the right amount and type of services. Leaving this
choice to an overburdened agency all too often results in insufficient services
and an inadequate reunification plan.
Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 4.
293. Granik, supra note 116, at 6 (encouraging parents' lawyers to work for visita-
tion between parent and child); see also Matthew B. Johnson, Eramining Risks to
Children in the Context of Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L
& Soc. Change 397, 408 (1996) (stressing that visitation between a parent and her
child in foster care is essential to the child's psychological well-being).
294. Beyer, supra note 98, at 336 (discussing the important role that visitation plays
in successful reunifications).
295. Guggenheim, Proposal, supra note 126, at 5 ("[Vlisitation is recognized to be
the key to reunification. Lawyers can play a crucial role in expanding the number of
hours of visitation per week-and thereby increasing the likelihood that children will
maintain a relationship with their parents and return home more quickly.").
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alone: The key to successfully healing families in poverty is to help
them to help themselves. 296 Lawyers for indigent parents must edu-
cate parents about the child welfare system that has entered their
homes and their lives. 297 They must motivate parents to become ac-
tive participants in planning for their families' futures.298 Lawyers
must strengthen families by teaching them to demand and gain respect
in the child welfare system.2 9 9 And, parents' lawyers must empower
families by giving them the necessary tools to exercise control over
their own circumstances:
By recognizing a family's strengths and listening to the family's own
assessment of its needs, [professionals in the child welfare system]
empower[ ] the family .... Reaching agreement with a family on
[its] needs leads to [its] active involvement in crafting services and
[helps the family take] responsibility for change. Instead of sending
the family to a program to have something done to it, the message
is: You have agreed on what you need. The services you have
helped to plan will assist you in getting your needs met.2
°
Perhaps such active participation by motivated, loving, and well-inten-
tioned parents will help the child welfare system respect families in
poverty301 and understand that parents charged with neglect do have
the capacity and desire to change.3°  Given the obstacles in the cur-
rent child protective system that prevent parents' voices from being
heard-one of the largest of which may be the national move away
from family preservation-it seems unlikely that families in poverty
will come to actively participate on their own. Thus, without the dedi-
cation and service of effective, competent, and enthusiastic lawyers,
296. Criticizing the current child protective system that deals with families in an
improperly detached manner, Janet Weinstein writes: "Parents involved in the child
protection system ... find themselves caught in a process where they are forced to
become dependent upon professionals who claim to know more about their child's
needs than they do." Weinstein, supra note 75, at 154. Alternatively, the author pro-
poses a different type of system that promotes collective responsibility. Id. at 139-74.
297. See Parents on the Periphery, Child Welfare Watch, Winter 1997, at 6-7 (stating
that too often parents do not understand the role that they can and must play in the
child welfare system).
298. See Beyer, supra note 98, at 324 ("Designing family support to succeed entails
collaboration among the family and caregivers in crafting unique services to match
the strengths and needs of that child and family.").
299. See Garcia & Batey, supra note 90, at 1098 ("[Pjarents must receive and
should demand a level of respect that allows them to contribute meaningfully to de-
terminations about the future of their children.").
300. Beyer, supra note 98, at 316 (footnote omitted).
301. See National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Con-
munity Responsibility for Child Protection (visited Mar. 9, 1998) <http://
www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/commresp.htm> ("Professionals must recognize that
most parents do not intend to harm their children. Rather, abuse and neglect may be
the result of a combination of psychological, social, situational, and societal factors.").
302. See id. ("Service providers should recognize that many maltreating adults have
the capacity to change their abusive/neglectful behavior, given sufficient help and re-
sources to do so.").
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families in poverty may be tragically lost in this new, changing tide of
child welfare law in the nation.
CONCLUSION
Most likely out of concern for severely abused and maltreated chil-
dren, our nation's child welfare system often ignores the needs of indi-
gent parents accused of child neglect. The lack of attention paid to
parents in poverty, however, also ignores the special bonds that chil-
dren have to their parents and presumes that all children are better-
off when separated from allegedly neglectful parents. In reality,
though, ripping children away from their homes and their families
often harms children more than the underlying cause for the alleged
neglect. Furthermore, parents in poverty may be inappropriately
charged with neglect when their difficult economic situations, and not
their fitness as parents, is really the issue. Unfortunately, our child
welfare system continuously responds to poor families' needs in inef-
fective and improper manners.
The newest piece of federal legislation affecting the child welfare
system-The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997-may continue
to disserve poor and needy families. Intended to make children's
health and safety the primary focus of child protective proceedings,
the ASF forces child welfare officials to give up on parents sooner
than before. Because indigent parents may have difficulty correcting
their families' situations with the speed with which the federal govern-
ment now requires, the ASF may actually work to hurt children by
dissolving loving, salvageable families.
Accordingly, to protect against harming children and families who
enter the child welfare system on allegations of neglect, states must
provide indigent parents with competent and effective court-ap-
pointed counsel. Parents' lawyers can provide their clients with a
voice in the child welfare system that otherwise harbors negative feel-
ings toward parents. Furthermore, effective counsel for parents can
work to alleviate the current imbalance of power against parents in
child protective proceedings. Most importantly, though, lawyers for
indigent parents can help heal and reunite needy families. By estab-
lishing relationships with their clients and knowing how to navigate
through the child welfare system, parents' lawyers can advocate for
services that are carefully-tailored to their clients' needs. To this end,
parents' lawyers can help to realize Congress's goal of expedited child
protective cases by ensuring that families in the child welfare system
are most efficiently and most appropriately served. Thus, rather than
giving up on parents, the best way to protect the health and safety of
all children is to take the time to care for and to work with families in
need. Providing indigent parents with a meaningful right to counsel in
neglect proceedings is crucial to this effort.
1998] 2331
Notes & Observations
